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 I. LEGISLATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
EU competition policy as a lever of the Single Market: the EU´s main engine for growth 
The key aim of EU competition policy is to protect competition so that markets work better 
for consumers and businesses. In this regard, EU competition policy supports the Europe 2020 
Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. In particular, EU competition policy 
forms is an essential part of and a complement to the EU's key asset: its Single Market, which 
encompasses over half a billion consumers and some 20 million businesses. Tapping the full 
potential of the Single Market is therefore essential for the EU to recover from the economic 
and financial crisis and to launch a new period of growth. During the past year, EU 
competition policy has made significant contributions in terms of protecting, strengthening 
and developing the Single Market. Crucially, the enforcement of EU competition policy was 
not relaxed as a result of the crisis, since that would have been directly harmful to the Single 
Market and the process of economic recovery. 
 State aid 
The economic and financial crisis entailed greater State involvement in the economy, placing 
burdens on Member States' budgets with increasingly uneven spending capacities. At the 
same time, such State aid involvement – given its sheer size - created considerable risks of 
distortions for the Single Market.  
The latest figures on the scale of crisis and non-crisis State aid 
The European Commission's 2012 State Aid Scoreboard revealed that the volume of national support to the 
financial sector actually taken by banks between October 2008 and 31 December 2011 amounted to around EUR 
1.6 trillion (13% of EU GDP). The bulk (67%) of that support came in the form of State guarantees on banks' 
wholesale funding.  
Support to the real economy on the basis of temporary crisis rules dropped to EUR 4.8 billion in 2011, a fall of 
more than 50% compared to 2010, reflecting both a lower uptake by companies and the budgetary constraints of 
most EU Member States.  
Total non-crisis aid decreased and stood at EUR 64.3 billion in 2011, or 0.5% of EU GDP, and continued to re-
focus on less distortive horizontal objectives, such as aid for research and innovation, protection of the 
environment and providing risk capital to SMEs. 
The contribution of State aid policy has been crucial throughout the crisis in preserving the 
integrity of the Single Market. Beyond that, State aid policy can play an important 
contribution to overcoming the crisis by supporting the Europe 2020 Strategy, for example by 
favouring a better and more effective use of scarce public resources. In other words, EU State 
aid policy should facilitate the treatment of aid which is well-designed, targeted at identified 
market failures and objectives of common interest, and least distortive ("good aid"), while 
dissuading aid which does not provide real incentives for companies, crowds out private 
investment, and keeps inefficient and non-viable companies on life support ("bad aid") and 
harms the Single Market. 
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1. State Aid Modernisation: an overhaul of the State aid rules to strengthen the Single 
Market and support growth in a context of scarce public resources  
On 8 May 2012 the Commission launched an ambitious State Aid Modernisation programme 
("SAM")1. SAM aims at orienting scarce public funds towards growth, turning State aid 
policy into a smart and inexpensive tool to help Member States "achieve more with less". 
SAM allows Member States to increase their own level of commitment accordingly. Three 
key components of the overall objective of SAM – promoting growth in a context of severe 
budgetary constraints – are outlined below. 
Making the Single Market stronger, more dynamic and more competitive to support growth 
SAM proposes a framework for assessing whether State aid is compatible with the Single 
Market which has been tailored to promote efficient and well-designed aid addressing real 
market failures, directing scarce public resources to common priorities ("good aid"). Priority 
will be given to, for example, aid for research and development, aid facilitating access to 
finance for SMEs, aid providing the right incentives for the development of the digital 
economy, aid that protects the environment, as well as aid that attracts investment to weaker 
regions. 
The review of those rules to ensure compatibility with the Single Market in the context of 
SAM is based on a coordinated approach rooted in common principles, so as to ensure 
consistency across the different guidelines and block exemptions. 
First of all, in light of the opportunity costs of State aid in terms of the costs of taxation and 
the potential distortions it can bring about, State aid should be granted only where it adds real 
value. This is the case when aid is directed towards activities that the market does not 
adequately support2; when aid has an incentive effect and when aid is an appropriate 
instrument to tackle a market failure or an equity objective compared to other available 
instruments. Finally, State aid should also be efficient, i.e. reach the desired market outcome 
at the least cost. 
At the same time, SAM envisages that the Commission should step up its analysis of potential 
negative effects of aid measures. Such negative effects include windfall profits, the crowding 
out of private investment, public spending when similar projects are undertaken without aid, 
as well as keeping inefficient and non-viable companies on the market. Taxpayers, companies 
and public authorities would also benefit from more transparency on expenditures and aid 
beneficiaries. 
The operational aim of SAM is to translate those essential building blocks into revised State 
aid guidelines, thereby further aligning those guidelines with the Europe 2020 Strategy and 
the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020. This past year progress was made, in 
particular, on the review of the guidelines for regional aid, research & development & 
innovation aid, environmental aid as well as aid to risk capital. State aid under those 
instruments accounts for more than two-thirds of all aid granted in the EU. 
                                                            
1 Communication of 8 May 2012 from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM), 
COM(2012) 209 final 
2 For example, State aid for risk capital can leverage private investments to sustain start-ups and aid. Aid to R&D 
has the potential to promote new and otherwise unrealised innovative projects, especially where it increases 
(rather than replaces) private funding of R&D 
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The Broadband Guidelines: A concrete example of the philosophy underlying SAM 
This past year the Commission adopted new Broadband Guidelines, a set of rules which illustrate concretely the 
philosophy underlying SAM. The new Guidelines were designed to support pro-competitive investments with 
public funds in line with the Europe 2020 Strategy in general and the Europe 2020 Digital Agenda flagship 
initiative in particular; for example, through the creation of the additional category of 'ultra-fast networks' in line 
with the Digital Agenda targets. The Guidelines will also lay down revised conditions so as to foster investments 
in rural areas and to ease administrative burdens on smaller projects. Under the Guidelines, aid will always be 
directed to areas of genuine 'market failure' (i.e. where operators do not invest on commercial terms), verified by 
detailed mapping and public consultation. The aid beneficiary shall always be selected through a competitive 
tender procedure, so as to ensure that aid is kept to a minimum and that no technology or company receives an 
undue advantage. The 'open access' required from the beneficiary company ensures competition in the subsidised 
area to create optimal conditions for better and cheaper broadband services for consumers. All relevant acts and 
pertinent information about the aid awarded under aid schemes shall be easily accessible on the Internet by the 
Member States, economic operators, the interested public and the Commission. Finally, an evaluation may be 
required for aid schemes with large aid budgets, containing novel characteristics or when significant market, 
technology or regulatory changes are foreseen. 
Focusing on cases with the biggest impact on the Single Market  
The SAM policy objective here is two-fold: to reduce to the minimum the administrative 
burdens related to smaller amounts of aid or aid with a limited impact on competition and 
trade in the Single Market, and to focus on aid which does not provide real incentives for 
companies, crowds out private investment and keeps inefficient and non-viable companies on 
life support ('bad aid'). The reduction of administrative burdens should go hand in hand with 
an increased responsibility of the Member States and with increased transparency and 
effective evaluation at both national and EU level. The exclusive competence of assessing the 
compatibility of State aid measures will, as set out in the Treaty, remain with the 
Commission. 
In pursuit of that objective, the Commission adopted a draft Enabling Regulation3 and will 
subsequently adopt a revised General Block Exemption Regulation with the aim of cutting red 
tape for small and routine cases. The proposal for a new Enabling Regulation provides for the 
following new categories of aid to be exempted: aid for innovation, aid for culture and 
heritage conservation, aid to compensate damages caused by natural disasters, aid to forestry 
as well as certain types of aid for transport and for broadband infrastructure.  
Streamlined and clearer rules and faster decisions  
The SAM Communication emphasises the need to clarify and simplify the existing complex 
legal framework. That challenge will be addressed by providing a better explanation of State 
aid concepts and a consolidation of horizontal and substantive rules. A key part of the SAM 
package involves clarifying and better explaining the notion of State aid. The Commission 
sees a substantial value added for Member States and aid granting authorities by providing 
guidance on the notion of aid, including the key concepts of "advantage" and "selectivity". 
The Commission also proposes measures to make its procedures more efficient. On 5 
December 2012 the Commission adopted a draft of the new Procedural Regulation4 which 
would allow the Commission to handle complaints in a manner that is more consistent with its 
priorities and would ensure that the Commission obtains complete and correct information 
from the market (market information tools and sector inquiries).  
                                                            
3 See MEMO/12/936 of 5 December 2012 
4 See MEMO/12/942 of 5 December 2012 
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Moreover, the objective to strengthen the Single Market and promote growth can only be 
achieved if the Commission has the ability to prioritise its work. This efficiency objective will 
be achieved by introducing filters to improve the quality of the information received from the 
complainants (e.g. mandatory complaints form) and by making the evaluation of the 
admissibility of a complaint subject to the existence of an interest to act. Furthermore, under 
SAM, a complaint will be considered withdrawn where the complainant does not provide 
meaningful information or fails to cooperate. 
Another essential feature of the procedural reform is the power to collect the appropriate 
information on a case within business-relevant deadlines, which will be achieved by 
empowering the Commission to obtain faster and more reliable information from market 
participants if the information at its disposal is not sufficient following the formal 
investigation procedure. The possibility of conducting sector inquiries to reinforce horizontal 
information will also allow the Commission to focus on the most distortive cases.  
Finally, the role of the national courts shall be reinforced: first, by empowering those courts to 
obtain information from the Commission for the purpose of applying Article 107(1) and 108 
TFEU and to ask the Commission for an opinion; and, second, by empowering the 
Commission to make oral or written submissions to national courts in the Union public 
interest (amicus curiae). 
2. Monitoring, recovery and cooperation with national courts 
Monitoring existing State aid to ensure a level playing field in the Single Market 
Over the years, the architecture of State aid control has evolved significantly. Today, more 
than 87% of aid granted to industry and services is not individually examined by the 
Commission, but is granted on the basis of previously approved aid schemes or under block 
exemption. DG Competition monitors the way in which Member States apply existing aid 
schemes.  
To further improve the effectiveness of that control which is relevant to the proper 
functioning of the Single Market, DG Competition decided, in 2011, to significantly enlarge 
the scope of the monitoring exercise. Although the investigation of a number of cases is still 
on-going, there seems to be an overall an increase in the number of problematic cases. More 
than one third of the cases monitored in 2011/2012 raise problems of varying types and 
gravity (non-notified modification of schemes, individual aids exceeding the maximum 
thresholds, compatibility conditions not properly reflected in the national legal basis etc.). 
Keeping in mind the limited number of cases monitored thus far (compared to the great 
number of existing aid schemes), the compliance rate seems to vary across Member States and 
across different types of aid. The Commission will systematically follow-up all irregularities. 
At the same time, Member States must step-up their efforts to better comply with the State aid 
rules.  
Restoring competition in the Single Market through recovery of State aid granted in contravention of 
the rules 
To ensure the integrity of the Single Market, the Commission possesses the power to require 
the granting Member State to recover unlawful aid which has been declared incompatible. In 
2012, further progress was made to ensure that recovery decisions are enforced effectively 
and immediately.  
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Much faster recovery of illegal aid  
The most recent figures also show that Member States are also recovering illegal aid much faster, with 75% 
(around EUR 11.7 billion since December 2004) recovered at the end of December 2012 thanks to the 
Commission's action and probably facilitated by the pressure to consolidate public finances. This means that the 
percentage of illegal and incompatible aid still to be recovered was down to 25% by end-December 2012 having 
stood at 75% at the end of 2004. 
By 31 December 2012, the Commission had adopted twelve decisions ordering the recovery 
of incompatible aid, thereby ensuring the recovery of over EUR 2.4 billion granted by the 
Member States. As of the end of December 2012, the Commission had 49 pending active 
recovery cases pending5 (compared to 94 cases at the end of 2004). 
Recovery decisions adopted in 2012 12 
Amount recovered in 2012 (in EUR billion) EUR 2.4 billion 
Active recovery cases pending on 31 December 2012 49 
A concrete example of aid that is incompatible with the State aid rules and which the 
Commission decided during the past year that should be recovered is the aid granted by 
Belgium to BPost, as a public service compensation. That compensation exceeded the costs 
related to the delivery of newspapers and magazines for the period 2006-2010. On 23 January 
2012, the Commission ordered Belgium to recover the incompatible aid. The Belgian 
authorities diligently fulfilled their obligation by the end of May 2012. 
As the guardian of the Treaty, the Commission may use all legal means at its disposal to 
ensure that Member States implement their recovery obligations, including the launching of 
infringement procedures. In the first half of 2012, the Court of Justice condemned two 
Member States pursuant to Article 108(2) TFEU (Italy and Greece) and one Member State 
pursuant to Article 260 TFEU (Spain) for failure to recover illegal State aid. 
Cooperation with national courts to ensure the effectiveness of State aid rules on the ground 
As a follow-up to the 2009 Notice on the Enforcement of State Aid Law by National Courts, 
advocacy efforts by the Commission were intensified. In 2012 the Commission was actively 
involved in financing training programmes for national judges following an annual call for 
projects and also sent trainers to teach at such workshops and conferences. In February 2012, 
a dedicated one-day workshop, covering both antitrust and State aid issues relevant for 
national courts, was organised by the Commission in cooperation with the Association of 
European Competition Law Judges. 
3. Significant judgments by the EU Courts in the State aid area  
In a number of significant judgments, the EU courts clarified certain aspects of key State aid 
concepts, such as the notion of aid, the private market economy investor principle and the 
relationship between State aid and infrastructure. 
In Case C-288/11 P, Mitteldeutsche Flughafen AG et al. v Commission (also referred to as the 
Leipzig Halle airport case), the Court of Justice, in its judgment of 19 December 2012, 
dismissed an appeal brought by Mitteldeutsche Flughafen AG and Flughafen Leipzig‑Halle 
GmbH (‘FLH’) against the Leipzig-Halle judgment the General Court6. The main issue at 
                                                            
5 Five cases were transferred from the former unit in charge of State aid in DG TREN to DG COMP and are 
included in the present statistics for the first time this year 
6 Joined Cases T-443/08 and T-455/08 Freistaat Sachsen and Others v Commission [2011] ECR II-1311 
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stake in the appeal was whether the General Court had erred in law by qualifying the 
financing of the construction of a new runway for the airport as an economic activity. The 
Court of Justice fully confirmed the General Court's judgment, finding that the General Court 
had not erred in law in holding that the Commission had correctly considered the construction 
of the new southern runway by FLH to constitute an economic activity and that, consequently, 
the capital contributions, apart to the amount to be deducted in respect of expenses linked to 
the performance of public duties7, constituted State aid for the purpose of Article 107(1) 
TFEU. The Court of Justice held that the General Court had correctly established that the 
construction of the runway could not be dissociated from the operation of the airport 
infrastructure, which constituted an economic activity. It had also correctly found that the 
construction of the runway was not linked to the exercise of State authority.  
In its judgment of 5 June 2012 in Case C-124/10P, Commission v EDF, the Court of Justice 
dismissed the Commission’s appeal against the EDF judgment of General Court8, thus 
confirming the annulment by the General Court of a Commission decision of 2003 on State 
aid granted by France to EDF. The judgment is important for the interpretation of the market 
economy investor principle (MEIP). The issue before the Court was whether, in a situation 
where a Member State is both a fiscal creditor of a public undertaking and its sole 
shareholder, that State aid can rely on the MEIP where it makes a capital injection in that 
undertaking by waiving a tax claim, or whether the MEIP is inapplicable (as the Commission 
had considered in its decision) in view of the fiscal nature of the claim. The Court ruled that 
the role of the State as shareholder must be distinguished from its role as public authority and 
the applicability of the MEIP depends on whether the Member State conferred the fiscal 
advantage on the undertaking in its capacity as shareholder and not in its capacity as a public 
authority. The Court then clarified that, for a Member State to demonstrate that it acted in its 
capacity as a shareholder, it must provide objective and verifiable evidence showing clearly 
that, before or at the same time as conferring the economic advantage, it took the decision to 
make the investment concerned. Finally, the Court clarified that the MEIP test is not an 
exception which applies only if a Member State so requests. 
On 28 February 2012, the General Court gave judgment in Case T-268/08, Land Burgenland 
et al v. Commission, concerning a Commission decision in the field of State aid in connection 
with the privatisation of Bank Burgenland by the Province of Burgenland through a tender 
procedure. In the final phase of the tender two bids were submitted, one by the Austrian 
company GRAWE (EUR 100.3 million) and a much higher bid by a Ukrainian Consortium 
(EUR 155 million). The tender was awarded to GRAWE. The Commission found that the sale 
constituted State aid for GRAWE because, by not accepting the highest bid, the Province of 
Burgenland did not behave like a private seller operating in a market economy. In its 
judgment, the General Court dismissed the actions brought by the Province of Burgenland, the 
Republic of Austria and the purchaser of the bank. The Court confirmed that in the case of a 
sale of an undertaking by a public authority the market price corresponds to the highest price 
that a private investor operating in normal competitive conditions would be prepared to pay. 
When the public authority makes use of an open, transparent and unconditional tender 
procedure, it can therefore be presumed that the market price corresponds to the highest offer, 
provided that it is established, firstly, that that offer is binding and credible and, secondly, that 
the taking into account of economic factors other than the price is not justified, such as the off 
balance-sheet risks existing between the offers. Therefore, the Commission did not commit a 
                                                            
7 Expenses for security and police functions, fire-protection, German meteorological service and air-traffic 
control service 
8 Case T-156/04 EDF v Commission [2009] ECR II-4503 
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manifest error of assessment in concluding that the aid element can be assessed from the 
market price, which itself depends on the offers actually made within the context of the call 
for tenders. 
In Case T-154/10 France v Commission, the General Court, in its judgment of the General 
Court of 20 September 2012, upheld a Commission decision from 2010 finding that La 
Poste's status as an EPIC (Établissement Public à caractère Industriel et Commercial) resulted 
in an advantage to the undertaking in the form of an implicit unlimited guarantee. The Court 
confirmed the Commission's finding that French law, in general, did not preclude the 
possibility for the State to grant an implied guarantee to EPICs. The existence of an unlimited 
State guarantee in favour of EPICs could, in the Court´s view, be derived from the fact that 
insolvency and bankruptcy procedures under ordinary law do not apply to EPICs. The law 
applicable to EPIC placed creditors in a more favourable situation as their claims are not 
cancelled but at the most postponed. Also, the Court found that the Commission was correct 
in concluding that State liability could be incurred for the debts of an EPIC where a creditor 
of an EPIC was not able to recover its claim from the undertaking which amounts to an 
automatic guarantee mechanism. Finally, the principle of continuity of public service requires 
that the rights and obligations attached to the public service are transferred to the State in the 
event of a wound-up EPIC which triggers State liability. With regard to the question of 
whether that unlimited guarantee resulted in an advantage for La Poste, the Court confirmed 
the Commission's finding that the grant of a guarantee on non-market terms is, as a rule, liable 
to confer an advantage on the recipient. The Commission was allowed to refer to the findings 
of rating agencies to establish that La Poste enjoyed more favourable terms of credit and, 
therefore, a financial advantage. 
 Antitrust & Cartels 
1. Moving towards a formal proposal on private enforcement of the EU antitrust rules  
In 2012, the Commission continued preparatory work on a legislative proposal on antitrust 
damages actions9. As stated in the Commission Work Programme 2012 (Annex I, item 7), the 
objective of this legislative initiative would be to ensure effective damages actions before 
national courts for breaches of EU antitrust rules and to clarify the relationship between such 
private actions and public enforcement by the Commission and the national competition 
authorities, notably as regards the protection of leniency programmes, in order to preserve the 
central role of public enforcement in the EU10. In February 2012, the European Parliament 
welcomed the initiative and underlined the need for action at European level11. Insofar as 
collective redress is concerned, the European Parliament requested that any Union initiative 
should be of a horizontal nature, not limited to specific sectors of Union law. However, the 
Parliament acknowledged the specificity of competition law enforcement and therefore 
considered that specific rules could be laid down in separate articles or chapters of the 
                                                            
9 As stated in the Commission Work Programme 2012 (Annex I, item 7), the objective of this legislative 
initiative would be to ensure effective damages actions before national courts for breaches of EU antitrust rules 
and to clarify the relationship between such private actions and public enforcement by the Commission and the 
national competition authorities, notably as regards the protection of leniency programmes, in order to preserve 
the central role of public enforcement in the EU. The Work Programme is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/key-documents/index_en.htm 
10 The Work Programme is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/key-documents/index_en.htm 
11 European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on the Annual Report on EU Competition Policy, also 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2012-
0031+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
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horizontal instrument itself or in separate legal instruments in parallel or subsequent to the 
adoption of the horizontal instrument12.  
 
On 6 December, Vice President Almunia declared his intention to submit to the College a 
legislative proposal on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. He stated that such a proposal, once adopted, 
would give more legal certainty on a number of issues that lie at the crossroads between the 
public and private enforcement of EU competition law, in particular regarding access to 
evidence relating to leniency requests. Also, the Vice President took due note of the European 
Parliament's call for a European initiative on collective redress to ensure appropriate access to 
justice for all. He declared his willingness to continue to work towards a coherent European 
policy on collective redress, while drawing attention of the Parliament to the specificities of 
competition law. 
2. Further refining the leniency regime: a core enforcement tool in the fight against secret 
cartels 
Leniency programmes constitute a key driver for the detection of cartels. The European 
Competition Network (ECN) recently strengthened the Model Leniency Programme (“MLP” 
around which the ECN competition authorities align their own leniency procedures. Under the 
refined MLP, agreed in November by the Heads of the competition authorities within the 
ECN, all leniency applicants applying to the European Commission in cases concerning more 
than three Member States will now be able to submit a summary application to national 
competition authorities while in the past only the immunity applicant could do so. Also, the 
ECN agreed on a standard template for summary applications, which companies will be able 
to use in all Member States. A number of clarifications are introduced in the MLP, notably in 
relation to the conditions which applicants must meet in order to qualify for leniency, 
including on the duty to cooperate. The revised text also clarified that written leniency 
statements should benefit from the same level of protection against disclosure by the 
competition authorities as oral statements. Furthermore, the ECN underlined the importance 
of the leniency programmes in a Resolution endorsed on 23 May, in which the competition 
authorities took the joint position that leniency materials should be protected against 
disclosure to the extent necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the leniency programmes13. 
The legislative proposal on antitrust damages actions mentioned above will seek to ensure the 
effectiveness of the leniency system.  
Settlements: an additional tool for the cost-effective resolution of antitrust proceedings 
Settlement continues to be a key tool, entailing significant procedural benefits. The fact that the number of 
settlement decisions decreased in 2012 as compared to 2011 should not be interpreted as a trend, in view of the 
number of cases where the settlement route is pursued or considered. The Commission's policy is to use this 
efficiency-enhancing instrument in the future if a case is suitable for settlement in order to free more quickly 
additional resources to fight other cases including via ex officio proceedings. In 2012, the Commission adopted 
one such decision, fining producers of water management products EUR 13 million in sixth cartel settlements 
(Cases COMP/39611 Water Management Products, press release of 27 June 2012). 
                                                            
12 See points 15 and 17 of European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on ‘Towards a Coherent European 
Approach to Collective Redress’ available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2012-
0021&language=EN&ring=A7-2012-0012 
13 Resolution of the Meeting of the Heads of the European Competition Authorities of 23 May 2012 
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3. Significant judgments by the EU Courts in the area of antitrust  
In MasterCard14 the General Court dismissed an action brought by MasterCard against a 
Commission decision of 2007 prohibiting MasterCard's cross-border inter-bank fees. The 
judgment is important because it confirms the Commission's finding that these fees restrict 
competition as they inflate the cost of card acceptance by merchants without leading to 
benefits for consumers. The judgment also confirms that banks, in the framework of a card 
payment scheme, cannot restrict competition by agreeing on certain charges to the detriment 
of consumers. 
MasterCard's business model includes a mechanism through which banks indirectly determine 
a minimum price that merchants must pay for accepting the organisation's payment cards. 
This mechanism comprises a complex network of multilaterally agreed inter-bank fees which 
industry refers to as "multilateral interchange fees" or MIFs.  
In December 2007, the Commission prohibited MasterCard's collectively agreed multilateral 
interchange fees because they inflate the base on which acquiring banks charge prices to 
merchants, as the interchange fees account for a large part of the final price merchants pay for 
accepting MasterCard's payment cards. This restriction of price competition in the form of a 
decision of an association of undertakings was found to harm businesses and their customers, 
in breach of Article 101 of the Treaty on the functioning of the EU (TFEU) that prohibits 
anticompetitive business practices. There was also no evidence that such fees generated 
benefits that were passed on to consumers.  
In its judgment, the General Court rejected MasterCard's claims and upheld the Commission's 
finding of an infringement. In particular, the Court endorsed the Commission's view that 
multilateral interchange fees constitute a restriction of competition as they were found to 
produce anticompetitive effects and rejected MasterCard's argument that such fees were 
objectively necessary for the functioning of its system. Also, the Court endorsed the 
Commission's finding that MasterCard constituted an association of undertakings in the sense 
of Article 101(1) TFEU, even after the company's listing at the New York Stock Exchange in 
2006. The Court also took the view that the Commission did not commit procedural errors 
and that the prohibition it imposed was proportionate. 
MasterCard has appealed the General Court’s judgment to the Court of Justice (Case C-
382/12 P pending). 
In AstraZeneca15 the Court of Justice dismissed an appeal brought by AstraZeneca against the 
judgment by the General Court of 2010 which had upheld – to a very large extent – a 
Commission's decision from June 2005. The Commission had fined AstraZeneca EUR 
60 million for abusing its dominant position relating to its best-selling anti-ulcer medicine 
Losec. 
The judgment concerned two types of misuses of regulatory procedures and systems. It did 
not concern abuses or misuses of patents or other intellectual property rights. The first abuse 
upheld by the Court involved the provision by AstraZeneca of misleading information to 
national patent offices with the aim of preventing or delaying market entry of competing 
generic products. On the first abuse the Court found that the assessment whether 
representations made to public authorities for the purposes of improperly obtaining exclusive 
                                                            
14 Case T-111/08, MasterCard and Others v Commission,  judgment of 24 May 2012 
15 Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v Commission, judgment of 6 December 2012 
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rights are misleading must be made in concreto and may vary according to the specific 
circumstances of each case.  
The second abuse involved the deregistration by AstraZeneca of its market authorisation for 
its bestselling ulcer medicine Losec in selected countries with the aim of raising barriers 
against generic entry and parallel trade. The Court stated that an undertaking which holds a 
dominant position has a special responsibility under Article 102 and that it cannot therefore 
use regulatory procedures in such a way as to prevent or make more difficult entry of 
competitors on the market, in the absence of grounds relating to the defence of legitimate 
interests of an undertaking engaged in competition on the merits or in the absence of objective 
justification.  
The Court found that the illegality of abusive conduct under Article 102 is unrelated to the 
compliance or non-compliance by an undertaking of other legal rules and that, in the majority 
of cases abuses of dominant positions consist of behaviour which is otherwise lawful under 
branches of law other than competition law.  
The Court´s judgment also clarifies many issues in relation to the product market definition. 
The judgment also confirms that IPRs constitute a factor relevant to the determination of 
dominance. The Court's judgment finds that a dominant position is not prohibited, only its 
abuse and a finding that an undertaking has such a position is not in itself a criticism of the 
undertaking concerned.  
Cartel judgments: the Courts confirm the Commission´s approach to parental liability 
In a number of judgments (e.g. Case T-344/06 Total v Commission, paras 97-109; Case T-347/06 Nynäs 
Petroleum and Nynas Belgium v Commission, paras 30-41, judgments of 27 September 2012.), the Courts 
confirmed the Commission’s approach to parental liability. For example, the Courts delivered some orders (Case 
404/11P Elf Aquitaine v Commission, para 23, order of 2 February 2012; Case C-421/11P Total and Elf 
Aquitaine v Commission, paras 40-59, order of 7 February 2012; C-493/11P United Technologies v 
Commission, paras 37-45, order of 15 June 2012.) in which it again made clear that it fully upholds the 
rebuttable presumption that anti-competitive conduct by a wholly owned or virtually wholly owned subsidiary 
can be attributed to the parent company unless the parent proves that its subsidiary decides its commercial 
strategy on the market in full autonomy. The General Court also accepted the application of the rebuttable 
presumption in case of the ownership by two parents which form part of one group and together hold 100% of 
the subsidiary’s shares and upheld in two other judgments the imputation of parental liability in a 50/50 joint 
venture, applying the concept of “single economic entity” to joint venture constellations (Case T-76/08 EI du 
Pont de Nemours and Others v Commission, paras 59 and 76, judgment of 2 February 2012; Case T-77 Dow 
Chemicals v Commission, paras 74, 106-112 and 151, judgment of 2 February 2012). The General Court also 
accepted that the investment company can be liable for the conduct of its portfolio company (Case T-392/09 
1.garantovana v Commission, judgment of 12 December 2012). 
In the Dutch Bitumen cartel case, the General Court handed down 16 judgments in which it, 
for the most part, upheld a 2006 Commission decision that a number of petrochemical 
companies supplying road pavement bitumen and their road building clients had participated 
in a cartel with regard to the supply of road pavement bitumen in the Netherlands16. The 
General Court also provided guidance on the scope of the obligation of undertakings to 
cooperate during inspections17. 
In Nexans and Prysmian, it provided guidance on the Commission’s investigatory powers, 
such as the legal requirements of an inspection decision18. It also considered that measures 
                                                            
16 See in particular Case T-357/06 KWS v European Commission, judgment of 27 September 2012 
17 See in particular Case T-357/06 KWS v European Commission, judgment of 27 September 2012 
18 Cases T-135/09 Nexans v Commission and T-140/09 Prysmian v Commission, judgments of 14 November 
2012 
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implementing the inspection decision such as taking copies and images of electronic 
documents and asking questions during an inspection could not be challenged separately but 
only in the context of an action for annulment of the final decision adopted by the 
Commission under Article 101(1) TFEU19.  
In Bolloré, the General Court found that in a re-adoption scenario following the annulment of 
a decision due to a procedural error, the re-imposition of a fine in a new procedure which 
remedies the error is neither proscribed nor infringes the party’s rights of defence20. 
In Calcium Carbide, the General Court confirmed the Commission's analysis of the parties’ 
requests for fines reductions because of their alleged inability to pay (ITP) and concluded that 
the Commission made no error when rejecting all ITP claims based on point 35 of the Fining 
Guidelines21. 
4. The fight against cartels 
The Commission continued its vigorous enforcement of the competition rules against cartels, 
arguably the form of anticompetitive conduct which harms consumers, the Single Market and 
the economy to the greatest extent. In 2012, the Commission adopted five cartel decisions 
imposing fines totalling EUR 1 875 694 000 and concerning products of importance for 
consumers. The scope of some of the cases was particularly large, with several different 
infringements dealt with in one decision. The Commission also launched new investigations 
in a number of sectors, including financial services (derivatives), car parts, the food sector and 
maritime transport services. Several inspections were carried out to that effect. The 
Commission furthermore issued three Statements of Objections in cartel cases22. 
The TV and computer monitor tubes case: fines of EUR 1.47 billon imposed for a decade-long 
international cartel 
On 5 December, the European Commission fined seven international groups of companies a total of EUR 
1 470 515 000 for participating in either one or both of two distinct cartels in the sector of cathode ray tubes 
("CRT"). For almost ten years, between 1996 and 2006, these companies fixed prices, shared markets, allocated 
customers between themselves and restricted their output. One cartel concerned colour picture tubes used for 
televisions and the other one colour display tubes used in computer monitors. The cartels operated worldwide. 
The infringements found by the Commission covered the entire European Economic Area (EEA). Chunghwa, 
LG Electronics, Philips and Samsung SDI participated in both cartels, while Panasonic, Toshiba, MTPD 
(currently a Panasonic subsidiary) and Technicolor (formerly Thomson) participated only in the cartel for 
television tubes. Chunghwa received full immunity from fines under the Commission's 2006 Leniency Notice for 
the two cartels, as it was the first to reveal their existence to the Commission. Other companies received 
reductions of their fines for their cooperation in the investigation under the Commission's leniency programme.  
Cathode ray tubes constitute a very important component in the making of television and computer screens, 
accounting for 50 to 70% of the price. The two cartels are among the most organised cartels that the Commission 
has investigated. For almost ten years, the cartelists carried out the most harmful anti-competitive practices 
including price fixing, market sharing, customer allocation, capacity and output coordination and exchanges of 
commercial sensitive information. The cartelists also monitored the implementation, including auditing 
compliance with the capacity restrictions by plant visits in the case of the computer monitor tubes cartel. 
                                                            
19 Cases T-135/09 Nexans v Commission and T-140/09 Prysmian v Commission, judgments of 14 November 
2012 
20 Case T-372/10 Bolloré, judgment of 27 June 2012 
21 Case T-400/09 Ecka Granulate v Commission, judgment of 12 December 2012. 
22 Cases COMP/39611 Water Management Products, press release of 27.6.2012, IP/12/704; COMP/39633 
Shrimps, press release of 13.7.2012; IP/12/782, COMP/39639 ODD, press release of 24.7.2012, IP/12/830 and 
COMP/39583 Retail Food Packaging, press release of 28.09.2012, IP/12/1044 (with five different infringements 
covered by the same Statement of Objections) 
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There are 7 undertakings in TV & Computer Monitor tubes: MTPD and Panasonic (together 
with Toshiba for the JV period) formed only one undertaking 
Case name Adoption 
date 
Fine imposed Undertakings 
concerned  
Procedure 
Cathode ray tubes 05/12/2012 1 470 515 000 7 Normal 
Gas insulated switchgear 27/06/2012 136 260 000 2 
Re-adoption 
(normal) 
Water management 
products 
27/06/2012 13 661 000 3 Settlement 
Freight forwarding 28/03/2012 169 382 000 15 Normal 
Mountings for windows and 
window doors 
28/03/2012 85 876 000 9 Normal 
The Water Management Products decision was adopted following the settlement procedure. 
That brought to six the total number of settlement cases adopted since the procedure was 
introduced in 2008.  
Antitrust and cartel output 
 
5. Effective cooperation within the European Competition Network and with national 
courts  
Convergence of antitrust enforcement procedures contributes to a more level playing field in the 
Single Market  
Regulation 1/2003 was a key step in providing a more level playing field for businesses 
operating cross-border in the Single Market, as all EU competition enforcers including the 
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national competition authorities (NCAs) and national courts are able to apply the EU antitrust 
rules to cases that affect trade between Member States. This has meant that to a large extent 
the EU antitrust rules have become embedded across the Single Market. The European 
Commission and the NCAs cooperate closely within the European Competition Network 
(ECN) to ensure that the EU antitrust rules are applied coherently. 
While the NCAs now regularly apply the same substantive competition rules, they do so 
according to divergent procedures and they may impose a variety of sanctions. Even if 
competition national procedures are increasingly converging in the way they enforce EU 
antitrust law, as the 2009 Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/200323 had already found, 
differences on important aspects still remain which necessitates further examination and 
reflection. 
In the field of leniency, already in 2006 the ECN agreed on the ECN Model Leniency 
Programme (MLP) which has acted as a major catalyst in encouraging Member States and/or 
NCAs to introduce and develop their own leniency policies and in promoting convergence 
between them. In November 2012, the ECN further refined the MLP, as explained above.  
In November 2012, Reports by the ECN on investigative and decision-making powers were 
published, which for the first time provide an overview of the enforcement procedures within 
the ECN. These Reports demonstrate that national legislators have made clear efforts to make 
their procedures for the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU more convergent. Basic 
elements of decision-making powers and procedures, such as the power to take prohibition or 
commitment decisions or to grant interim measures are present in all or in a vast number of 
jurisdictions. Moreover, procedural steps that are crucial in terms of safeguarding the rights of 
defence of parties (such as the right to be heard through a statement of objections or 
equivalent; access to file) are present in all jurisdictions in one form or another.  
However, this has not led to uniformity. Divergence subsists on a few fundamental questions 
such as whether competition authorities have the power to set priorities or the legal 
framework for conducting interviews, as well as numerous aspects at a more detailed level, 
including the criteria for adopting interim measures and sanctions for non-compliance with 
investigatory measures. The Reports are intended to provide a basis for informed debate about 
the need for further procedural convergence within the ECN. The ECN will continue looking 
into this matter, in order to further enhance the level playing field for companies operating in 
the Single Market. 
Continuing the close cooperation with national courts 
As regards cooperation with national courts, the Commission continued to support the coherent and consistent 
application of EU competition rules at national level. The Commission now publishes its opinions and amicus 
curiae observations on its website24 as soon as it receives the approval for publication by the national court to 
which the opinion or observation was submitted. In 2012, the Commission submitted three amicus curiae 
observations under Article 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003 on different matters to courts in Belgium25, France26 and 
                                                            
23 See Commission Communication (COM (2009)206 final) 
24 Opinions and amicus curiae observations are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/overview_en.html 
25 In its observation (available at the link in footnote 4) the Commission held that tax deductibility of fines 
imposed by the Commission for infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU would undermine the deterrent 
character of such fines and is contrary to the principle of loyal cooperation as laid down in Article 4(3) TEU 
26 The Commission's observations concerned the interpretation of the notion of a "restriction by object" under 
Article 101 (3) TFEU 
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Slovakia27. The Belgian Constitutional Court followed in its judgment of 20 December 2012 the observations 
submitted by the Commission, while the two other cases are still pending. In two of the three amicus curiae 
observations submitted by the Commission in 2011, the receiving courts followed the Commission's 
observations in judgments handed down in 2012. The first case concerned possible inter partes disclosure of 
various documents, some of which contained information specifically prepared for the purpose of an application 
under the Commission's leniency programme28. The second case concerned the interpretation of the notion of 
"appreciable effect on trade between Member States"29. In the third case the receiving court submitted a 
reference for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ30. 
Cooperation with national courts was furthermore supported by the continued funding of a competition-specific 
training of judges program by the Commission31. 
6. Developing the international dimension of EU competition policy  
The globalisation of the economy calls for closer cooperation among competition authorities 
not only in Europe, but also across the globe. Such cooperation is essential to ensure 
interoperability between and consistency in the outcome of enforcement activities carried out 
by different authorities, to enhance the effectiveness of their investigations and to secure a 
level playing field for EU businesses in world markets. As in the past, and as encouraged by 
the European Parliament, the Commission has engaged in policy dialogues with the 
authorities in a number of other jurisdictions, at both multilateral and bilateral level, so as to 
promote convergence on both substantive and procedural competition rules. The Commission 
has also continued to cooperate closely with many competition agencies in concrete 
enforcement activities.  
At bilateral level, in 2012 the Commission strove to further strengthen cooperation with non-
EU competition authorities, focusing its efforts mainly on the EU's main trading partners 
(both traditional trading partners and major emerging economies). In this respect, high-level 
dialogues were held in 2012 with representatives of all the competition agencies with which 
the EU has concluded a cooperation agreement or a Memorandum of Understanding32. 
Likewise, the Commission engaged in fruitful discussions with the US federal competition 
authorities with a view to improving cooperation in the area of unilateral conduct, mergers 
and airline alliances. In the margin of the EU-China Summit on 20 September, DG 
Competition signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in the area of anti-
monopoly law with the National Development and Reform Council (NDRC) and the State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the two Chinese authorities responsible 
for the enforcement of the antitrust provisions of the Anti-Monopoly Law. On 1 June, the 
Commission recommended to the Council to sign and conclude a "Second Generation" 
cooperation agreement between the EU and Switzerland.  
                                                            
27 The Commission's observations concerned issues related to the parallel application of Articles 102 TFEU and 
the corresponding provisions in national law and to the possibility for a national competition authority to impose 
a fine for an infringement of the general prohibition of abuse of a dominant position laid down in Article 102 
TFEU 
28 Judgment of the High Court of England and Wales in National Grid on 4 April 2012 (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/overview_en.html) 
29 Judgment of the French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation) on 31 January 2012 (available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/overview_en.html) 
30 Case C-681/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde/Schenker and others, lodged by the Austrian Supreme Court 
(Oberster Gerichtshof) 
31 In 2012, the Commission funded eleven training programs in nine Member States. Further details are available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/training.html 
32 USA, Canada, Japan, South Korea, China, Brazil and Russia 
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Negotiations on a similar agreement between the EU and Canada have been progressing well. 
The European Commission continued negotiating Free Trade Agreements with a large 
number of third countries which all include competition chapters. The negotiation of the Free 
Trade Agreement with Singapore was concluded in 2012 and it contains a substantial chapter 
not only on antitrust, mergers and SOEs but also on subsidies to services and goods. In 
addition, the Commission continued to engage in technical cooperation activities with other 
non-EU competition authorities, in particular with the Chinese and Indian competition 
authorities. 
With respect to the accession negotiations with candidate countries, significant progress was 
made in 2012 with the opening and the provisional closure of the competition chapter with 
Iceland. In 2012 the Commission continued to monitor closely the implementation of the 
provisions of the steel and shipbuilding protocol included in the Accession Treaty for Croatia.  
The Commission has also continued its active engagement with international competition 
related fora such as the Competition Committee of the OECD, the International Competition 
Network and Unctad. In 2012, it took up responsibility as a co-chair of the Mergers Working 
Group of ICN and moved to a co-chair position of one of the Sub-Groups of the Cartel 
Working Group. In that same year, the Commission was also given responsibility as project 
leader (together with US FTC) for the Steering Group projects on investigative processes in 
competition enforcement activities. 
 Merger control 
1. Deepening cooperation with competition authorities in the Member States and third 
countries  
The EU merger control regime is essential in protecting consumer welfare by preventing 
market structures that could lead to unjustified price increases or reduction of choice, quality 
or innovation. It thus continues to be a key instrument for keeping the Single Market open and 
competitive, particularly in times of economic and financial crisis.  
Merger control by the Commission applies to transactions exceeding the significant turnover 
thresholds set up in the Merger Regulation and which have an impact on the market beyond 
the national borders of a particular Member State. Such mergers are reviewed exclusively at 
EU level in application of a ‘one-stop shop’ system. Concentrations not covered by the 
Merger Regulation fall, in principle, within the remit of the Member States. However, the 
Merger Regulation leaves scope for re-allocating cases from the national competition 
authorities (NCA) to the Commission and vice versa in order to ensure that the best placed 
authority deals with a case. In 2012, based on referral requests by two national competition 
authorities, the Commission became competent for reviewing a case33. Cooperation between 
the Commission and the NCAs can also become an important element outside the referral 
system34. 
                                                            
33 Case COMP/M.6796 Aegean /Olympic II 
34 Case COMP/M.6497 Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria, decision of 12.12.2012, press release of 
12.12.2012, IP/12/1361 
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Cooperation also proved important with non-EU countries. A number of cases35 involved 
intense cooperation with various competition authorities around the world. In these cases 
cooperation was particularly close with the authorities in the United States. 
Further, a reflection on a review of the Merger Regulation itself has been launched, in 
particular in relation to covering the acquisition of non-controlling minority shareholdings. 
2. A significant increase in number decisions with commitments from 2011  
The number of merger notifications in 2012 remained relatively stable. Overall, 283 cases 
were notified to the Commission in 2012, which represents about the average of the last four 
years. The Commission opened ten in-depth (i.e. second phase) investigations covering 
several sectors such as IT, mobile telephony, air transport, basic industries and music. 
The number of decisions by the Commission increased significantly in 2012 compared to 
2011, but remains stable compared to the average of the last four years. Whereas the number 
of prohibition decisions remains unchanged compared to 2011, with one case concluded by 
prohibition decision in 201236, six decisions37 in second phase were concluded with 
commitments in 2012 compared to one in 2011. In first phase, the number of clearance 
decisions which were adopted with commitments almost doubled with nine compared to five 
in 2011.  
As reflected in the increased number of second phase investigations and commitments in 
second phase decisions the assessment of the notified transactions also became more complex 
in 2012, a trend already observable in 2011. The review of, in particular, the second phase 
investigations generally requires sophisticated quantitative and qualitative analyses involving 
large amounts of data. 
                                                            
35 Cases COMP/M.6410 UTC/Goodrich, decision of 26.7.2012 and COMP/M.6381 Google/Motorola, decision 
of 13.2.2012 
36 Case COMP/M.6126 Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext, decision of 1.2.2012 
37 Cases COMP/M.6266 J&J/Synthes, decision of 18.4.2012; COMP/M.6286 Südzucker/ED&F MAN, decision 
of 16.5.2012; COMP/M.6410 UTC/Goodrich, decision of 26.7.2012; COMP/M.6458 Universal Music 
Group/EMI Music, decision of 21.9.2012; COMP/M.6471 Outokumpu/Inoxum, decision of 7.11.2012 and 
COMP/M.6497 Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria, decision of 12.12.2012 
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Merger decisions 
 
3. Simplifying merger procedures further 
In order to increase efficiency when dealing with unproblematic cases and to make the 
notification system more business friendly, a simplification exercise was launched in 2012, in 
particular with respect to transactions that clearly pose no problems to competition. While the 
current procedures, which also entail referring cases from EU countries to the Commission, 
work well, there is scope for making them smoother and shorter. 
4. Significant judgments by the EU Courts in merger control  
In Electrabel38, the General Court fully dismissed Electrabel's appeal of a Commission 
decision of June 2009 fining it EUR 20 million for acquiring control over Compagnie 
Nationale du Rhône without prior approval under the EU Merger Regulation. This was the 
first time that an EU court rules on a Commission decision to impose a fine for implementing 
a concentration of EU dimension without prior notification to and approval by the 
Commission. The GC confirmed that such early implementation constitutes a serious breach 
of EU merger control law. The Court also makes clear that the Commission is entitled to 
adopt effective and deterrent sanctions in case of such infringements.  
In Editions Odile Jacob and Agrofert39, the Court of Justice ruled on appeals by the 
Commission against two judgments of the General Court that had annulled a Commission 
decision refusing access to documents related to two merger cases. The ECJ confirmed that it 
is necessary to ensure a coherent application of the Transparanecy Regulation 1049/2001 with 
other rules of EU Law, in particular regulations designed to ensure respect for professional 
secrecy. The ECJ held in particular that the Commission can rely on the general presumption 
                                                            
38 Case T-332/09, judgment of 12 December 2012 
39 Cases C-404/10 P and C-477/10 P, judgments of 28 June 2012 
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that disclosure of the correspondence between the Commission and the parties to merger 
procedures would undermine the protection of the commercial interests of the parties and the 
purpose of the Commission's merger investigations, in order to refuse access to such 
correspondence even after the closure of proceedings. 
 II. SECTORAL OVERVIEW 
This section provides an overview of policy developments and enforcement actions in a 
number of selected sectors on which the Commission particularly focused in 2012: energy and 
environment, ICT and media, financial services, manufacturing, the agri-food industry, 
pharmaceutical and health services, and transport. 
 1. Energy & Environment  
Overview of key challenges in the sector  
This past year was a year in which governments and industry worldwide started a complex 
adjustment process in the wake of momentous events affecting the energy and environment 
sector in 2011, such as the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan. Coupled with the long-term 
trend of rising fuel prices and the high cost of renewable energy, those events added to the 
challenges faced by Member States to meet the Europe 2020 Strategy and the EU energy 
policy objectives. The strengthening and building of partnerships with the EU's key partners is 
also of strategic interest for secure, safe, sustainable and competitive energy. International 
cooperation with industrialised and fast growing economies is necessary to maintain Europe's 
position in energy research and innovation. 
The three pilars of the EU energy policy: competitiveness, sustainability and security of supply 
The EU Energy policy is built around three pillars: sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness. 
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions is vital to combating climate change. European consumers depend heavily 
on the secure and reliable provision of energy at competitive prices. Interconnection between European gas and 
electricity grids need to be substantially improved. The Commission's  Communication "Energy 2020 - A 
strategy for competitive, sustainable and secure energy" Communication calls for action in areas where new 
challenges are emerging. These areas are energy efficiency, infrastructure, choice and security for consumers, 
energy technology and the external dimension of the internal energy market. Competition enforcement and 
advocacy, along with sector-specific legislative proposals, constitute the main tools the Commission has at is 
disposal to achieve these goals and create a single European energy market by the 2020 target date. Given the 
strategic importance of the energy sector, the European Parliament, in its Resolution on the 2011 report on 
competition policy (the Sánchez Presedo report) continued to request that the Commission actively monitors the 
degree of competition on the market. 
EU Competition policy in the energy field aims to ensure a secure flow of energy, in 
particular electricity and gas, at competitive prices to EU households and businesses. An open 
and competitive single EU energy market will also guarantee secure provision of energy in 
the future by sending the necessary signals for investment and making the European market 
attractive to external suppliers. Such a market should also be open to new energy mixes and 
play a major role in developing and deploying new environmentally friendly technologies. 
Prices that reflect costs will help encourage energy efficiency, whilst supporting sustainability 
and security of supply. However, we are not there yet. The energy services (both gas and 
electricity) performed below the average in the most recent Consumer Markets Scoreboard, 
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with electricity supply being the 5th worst assessed services market (out of 30)40. Both 
markets have particularly poor scores on choice, comparability and switching suppliers and 
tariffs, suggesting that consumers do not actively participate in the market and are not making 
full use of the saving opportunities created by market liberalisation. The Commission´s action 
in the area of competition policy is therefore consistent with and supports the Commission´s 
legislative action to integrate the Single Market in electricity and gas (see the Commission´s 
Communication "Making the internal energy market work"). 
Contribution of EU competition policy in tackling the challenges 
Enhancing competitiveness across the energy sector  
Competition enforcement and advocacy in the field of energy and the environment contribute 
to the competitiveness of EU industry and the integration of the internal market by opening 
markets, creating a level playing field between competitors, preventing incumbents from 
reinforcing their dominant positions, inducing economic restructuring and creating a 
framework for investment that avoids distortions and ensures the efficient allocation of 
resources in the Single Market. 
Examples of enforcement actions by the Commission in 2012 underpinning those strategic 
objectives include an investigation into the conduct of power exchanges41, the opening of 
formal proceedings to investigate whether Bulgarian Energy Holding may be abusing its 
dominant market position in the wholesale electricity market in Bulgaria42, the opening of 
formal proceedings against the Romanian power exchange Opcom with respect to a suspected 
abuse of dominance in discriminating against non-Romanian traders43 and the decision to 
make binding commitments that reduce the product scope and duration of a non-compete 
obligation in the sector for nuclear technology (Siemes and Areva44). The Commission also 
fined three European producers of water management products45 for price coordination in an 
infringement which lasted from June 2006 to May 2008. Water management products are 
used in heating, cooling and sanitation systems and comprise pressurisation systems and 
products for quality assurance. The Commission used the settlement procedure to deal 
effectively with this case which was concluded on 27 June 2012 with the adoption of a 
prohibition decision on 27 June 2012 against three undertakings, which were fined a total of 
EUR 13.6 million. 
Moreover, the Commission actively monitored the implementation of remedies in several 
previous antitrust cases, all aimed at opening up national markets and preventing incumbents 
from abusing their dominant position in several Member States. The monitoring included the 
implementation of measures that would remedy competition concerns in the form of 
foreclosure (ENI46, E.On gas47 and GDF48), customer tying through long-term contracts for 
                                                            
40 8th Consumer Markets Scoreboard, 2012, Commission, DG SANCO, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_research/editions/cms8_en.htm 
41 Case COMP/39952 Power exchanges, see MEMO/12/78 of 7.2.2012 
42 Case COMP/39767 BEH electricity, IP/12/1307 of 3.12.2012 
43 Case COMP/39984 Romanian power exchange, IP/12/1355 of 11.12.2012 
44 Case COMP/39736 Siemens/Areva decision of 18.6.2012 
45 Case COMP/39611 Water management products, press release of 27.6.2012, IP/12/704 
46 Case COMP/39315 ENI, decision of 29 September 2010, OJ C352, 23.12.2010, p. 8-10, IP/10/1197 
47 Case COMP/39317 E.ON gas foreclosure, decision of 4 May 2010, OJ C278, 15.10.2010, p. 9-10, IP/10/494 
48 Case COMP/39316 GDF foreclosure, decision of 3 December 2009, OJ C57, 9.3.2010, p. 13-14, IP/09/1872 
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large electricity customers (EDF in France49) as well as restrictions on export capacity (SVK50 
in Sweden). 
The EU merger rules seek to ensure that mergers harmful to the competitive process are 
altered so that these effects do not occur or are avoided all together whilst allowing beneficial 
restructuring. During 2012, the Commission was able to approve a number of mergers, 
including mergers connected to restructuring of gas and electricity networks51 induced by 
liberalisation, as well as mergers linked to reneweable energy sources52. While the 
Commission did not have to intervene in new mergers that would have anti-competitive 
effects in 2012, it devoted considerable efforts to defending the EU's interests before the 
General Court53 and in ensuring that commitments to avoid harmful effects made in earlier 
merger cases by companies, such as EDF and GDF Suez54, were effectively complied with 
and enforced. Strict post-decision enforcement is critical as, otherwise, the anti-competitive 
effects that the earlier decisions sought to avoid could nevertheless materialise. 
Using its powers in the State aid field to preserve the integrity of the Single Market by 
controlling whether Member States use their public resources in a non-distortive manner, the 
Commission undertook enforcement action and adopted new rules in the field of energy and 
the environment. For example, the Commission opened a formal investigation on potential 
State aid in Romania in the form of privileged tariffs granted by the main electricity supplier 
to a range of companies55 and gave conditional approval to the aid component in regulated 
electricity tariffs in France56. The Commission also adopted rules on national support for 
industry electricity costs in the context of the EU Emission Trading Scheme57. 
Contributing to sustainability 
Sustainable development is the long term use of resources to meet human needs for energy, 
while preserving the environment. Sustainability was at the heart of the measures reviewed 
under the State aid rules under which the Commission authorised aid that supports renewable 
energy sources and environmentally friendly businesses. This is justified on the reasoning that 
State aid can correct market failures caused by so-called negative externalities, i.e. situations 
where environmental costs for society are not yet reflected in the production costs borne by 
companies. 
                                                            
49 Case COMP/39386 Long term electricity contracts in France, decision of 17 March 2010, OJ C133, 
22.5.2010, p. 5-6, IP/10/290 
50 Case COMP/39351 Swedish Interconnectors, decision of 14 April 2010, OJ C142, 1.6.2010, p. 28-29 
51 Such as M.6591 Tennet offshore GMBH / Mitsubishi Corporation / Tenet Offshore 2, M.6698 Cheung Kong 
Holdings / Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings / Power Assets Holdings / MGN Gas Networks UK and 
M.6508 GIP / Fluxys G / Fluxys Switserland 
52 Such as M.6669 CDC Infrastructure / Foresight Solar / Adenium Solar / VEI Capital / FOR VEI, M.6679 
Steag / Fronterasol / OHL Industrial / Arenales Solar and M.6540 Dong Energy Borkum Riffgrund I Holdco / 
Boston Holding / Borkum Riffgrund I Offshore Windpark 
53 Cases T-389/12 and T-389/12 R EDF v European Commission 
54 Such as the remedies accepted in M.5224 EDF / BE, M.5549 EDF / Segebel and M.5978 GDF Suez / 
International Power. Related cases were M.6422 Tokyo Gas / Siemens / Tessenderlo Chemie / International 
Power / GDF Suez / T-Power JV and M.6414 ITOCHU / Tessenderlo Chemie / Siemens Project Ventures / T-
Power JV 
55 Cases SA.33451, SA.33475 and SA.33581 (12/C) Alleged preferential tariffs in contracts of Hidroelectrica SA 
with electricity traders, Alleged preferential purchase tariffs of Hidroelectrica SA – thermo, Alleged preferential 
tariffs in contracts of Hidroelectrica SA with industrial producers, decisions of 25 April 2012, OJ C328, 
publication pending 
56 Case SA.21918 (C17/2007) Tarifs réglementés de l'électricité en France, decision of 12 June 2012 
57 Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
scheme post 2012, decision of 22 May 2012, OJ C154, 5.6.2012, p. 4 
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State support for renewable energy remains one of the key drivers for its deployment, based 
on the horizontal rules set out in the Environmental Aid Guidelines58. One set of cases 
concerned energy from renewable sources (e.g. in Ireland59, the Netherlands60, Austria61, the 
UK62 and France63). Other cases relate to the upgrading of existing energy infrastructure to 
higher environmental standards (e.g. in Greece64 and Poland65) and the use of environmentally 
friendly transport vehicles (UK66) and waste treatment (UK67). Work on the revision of the 
Environmental Aid Guidelines started in 2012, aiming both at taking stock of the experience 
of subsidising a range of technologies and at taking account of market developments. 
The Commission also approved State aid for the modernisation of electricity generation 
installations in Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Romania based on the 
regime established by Article 10c of the EU Emission Trading Directive68. Those Member 
States will be allowed to grant emission trading allowances free of charge with a view to 
promoting competition and increasing security of supply. Several other Member States are 
expected to come forward with similar plans. 
Contributing to security of supply 
The EU energy sector is characterised by a high dependency on imports, as the EU produces 
only 48% of its energy needs69. Energy dependency differs greatly among Member States. 
Denmark appears to be the only net energy exporter within the EU27, while the Baltic 
countries rely on a single source for their gas imports. The EU energy sector is also 
characterized by a significant need for investments, e.g. in electricity generation 
infrastructure, given the trend for gas and renewables to contribute more to electricity 
generation in the EU. 
The Commission's antitrust enforcement action in the energy sector can contribute to 
resolving security of supply issues by facilitating access to the market and encouraging 
investment. In 2012, the Commission continued its investigation of a possible abuse of 
dominance on the Czech electricity market through the hindrance of the entry of competitors 
and assessed commitments from ČEZ in the form of the divestment of lignite fired power 
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plants. The Commission also opened proceedings against Gazprom70 in Russia to investigate 
whether it abused its dominant market position in upstream gas supply markets in central and 
eastern European Member States by partitioning market, preventing diversification of supply 
of gas and/or imposing unfair prices on its customers by linking the price of gas to oil prices.  
 2. Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and Media  
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
As recognised in the Digital Agenda for Europe (the "Digital Agenda")71 and the 
Communication on e-commerce and other online services (the “E-commerce 
Communication”)72, Information and Communication Technologies ("ICT") play a key 
enabling role for Europe to achieve its strategic objectives under the Europe 2020 Strategy 
and, in particular, the objectives under the Digital Agenda flagship initiative. Creative content 
is also an essential input into the digital economy and a key driver of consumer demand for 
digital services. There is a very considerable growth potential in these sectors. In mature 
economies, internet related expenditure and consumption accounted for 21% of GDP growth 
during the past five years73. 
Furthermore, in light of the rapid technological developments which characterise these 
sectors, effective competition policy and enforcement are essential to address potential 
malfunctioning in the ICT and media sectors. 
Competition policy also plays an important role in shaping the Commission's legislative 
proposals in the media sector such as the July 2012 proposal for the Directive on collective 
rights management. The proposal's objective is to improve transparency and governance of 
collecting societies as well as facilitate multi-territorial licensing of the rights managed by 
collecting societies and consequently improve access to online music. In light of the 
Commission's enforcement experience in competition cases, the proposal contains a number 
of important competition law safeguards aimed at ensuring compliance with competition law 
in the collective management of copyright.  
Contribution of EU competition policy in tackling the challenges 
State aid policy is of growing importance in the ICT and media field. After the public 
consultation on an issues paper in 2011 to prepare the review of the rules for State aid to films 
and other audiovisual works74, a new draft Cinema Communication was published for 
consultation on 14 March. 2012. The review of the Broadband Guidelines75, which also 
started with the release of an issues paper in 2011, was pursued with the publication of draft 
Guidelines on 1 June 2012. Around 100 comments received from stakeholders were published 
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on DG COMP's website in October 2012. The new Guidelines, which mainly refine the 
previous guidelines, were adopted on 19 December 2012 and align the rules in this area with 
the targets of the Digital Agenda and accommodate changes in technology. 
The Commission has continued to use its enforcement tools to ensure unrestricted competition 
and growth in the ICT and media sectors to the benefit of consumers and to support the 
Commission's broader Digital Agenda goals. In this context, State aid has an important role to 
play in accelerating the deployment of broadband networks in Europe. Pro-competitive aid 
measures, which complement private investments in areas which are not profitable on 
commercial terms, are necessary to achieve the objectives of the Digital Agenda. The volume 
of State aid approved by the Commission in 21 decisions under the Broadband Guidelines in 
2012 amounted to EUR 6.555 billion in 2012. This is a steep increase compared with the EUR 
1.8 billion budgets approved in 2011 and 2010, notably because more Member States notify 
framework schemes with correspondingly higher budgets. 
Enforcement action against incumbent telecommunicatons operators  
In May 2012, the Commission sent a statement of objections to Slovak Telekom and to its 
parent company, Deutsche Telekom, in which the Commission took the preliminary view that 
Slovak Telekom may have abused its dominant position on several wholesale broadband 
markets in Slovakia since May 2004. In particular, Slovak Telekom may have refused to 
supply unbundled access to its local loops and wholesale services to competitors, and may 
have imposed a margin squeeze on alternative operators (Slovak Telekom itself would have 
operated at a loss if its own wholesale prices had applied to it. The Commission also 
considered on a preliminary basis that Deutsche Telekom may be held liable for the conduct, 
because of the nature and degree of its links with its subsidiary Slovak Telekom, in which it 
owns a majority stake of 51%.  
The Commission is also examining the observations received on the statement of objections 
sent to Telefónica and to Portugal Telecom in October 2011, regarding their agreement not to 
compete on the Iberian telecommunications markets, expressing the preliminary view that this 
agreement breaches Article 101 TFEU. This is the first case in the sector concerning a cross-
border market-sharing agreement, which is of particular importance to avoid that the Single 
Market continues to be artificially compartmentalised along national borders76.  
Ongoing enforcement in the market for internet search and advertising (Google) as well as injunctions 
based on standard essential patents (Samsung) 
Another case involving an alleged abuse of a dominant position concerns Google. The Commission has 
expressed concerns that four types of Google business practices may constitute an abuse of a dominant position 
within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU, namely: (i) the way in which Google’s vertical search services are 
displayed within general search results as compared to services of competitors; (ii) the way Google may use and 
display third party content on its vertical search services; (iii) exclusivity agreements for the delivery of Google 
search advertisements on other websites; and (iv) restrictions in the portability of AdWords advertising 
campaigns. Google submitted a detailed commitment text at the end of January 2013. The Commission's services 
are currently analysing Google's proposal with a view to deciding whether it would allow the Commission to 
commence the process for the adoption of a decision pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003.  
It also opened three proceedings77 concerning possible abuses by Samsung and Motorola of their standard 
essential patents, partly in order to provide more clarity in this field where the Commission received numerous 
complaints during the year. On 21 December 2012, in respect of one of those three proceedings, the Commission 
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sent a Statement of Objections to Samsung, informing it of the Commission’s preliminary view that Samsung's 
seeking of injunctions against Apple in various Member States on the basis of its mobile phone standard-
essential patents amounts to an abuse of a dominant position78. 
Enforcement linked to digitisation  
The Commission has also pursued several actions focusing on the impact of the transition to 
digital networks on content sectors.  
To ensure that the transition from analogue to digital terrestrial broadcasting and that the 
resulting digital dividend lead to new entry and broader viewer choice, EU law79 requires that 
such dividend is allocated subject to specific conditions (e.g. open, transparent and non-
discriminatory procedures). Following intervention by the Commission, France assigned 
frequencies to new operators in 2012, Bulgaria took legislative steps to address the breaches 
and Italy took steps with a view to assigning new digital frequencies (multiplexes) in 2013. 
On 12 December 2012, the Commission also adopted a commitment decision in the e-books 
sector, another nascent and fast-moving part of the digital economy, that rendered legally 
binding commitments offered by Apple and four international e-book publishers: Simon & 
Schuster (CBS Corp.), Harper Collins (News Corp.), Hachette Livre (Lagardère Publishing) 
and Verlagsgruppe Georg von Holtzbrinck (owner of inter alia Macmillan). 
The Commission had opened proceedings in December 2011 against these companies, as well 
as a fifth international e-book publisher, Penguin (Pearson Group). While the December 2012 
decision was not addressed to Penguin as that publisher chose not to offer commitments to the 
Commission, the Commission is currently engaged in constructive discussions with Penguin 
on commitments that would allow an early closure of proceedings also against that publisher.  
Furthermore, following the Premier League judgment80, the Commission conducted a fact-
finding investigation to examine whether licensing agreements for premium pay-TV content 
contain absolute territorial protection clauses which may restrict competition, hinder the 
completion of the Single Market and prevent consumers from cross-border access to premium 
sports and film content.  
ICT in the context of the Merger Regulation 
Finally, through the Merger Regulation, the Commission ensures that the ICT and media 
sectors remain competitive and open for new entrants, and that access to key elements 
(whether content, technology or interconnection) is not denied. The Commission also aims at 
ensuring that consumers do not suffer from higher prices, less choice, poorer quality and 
limited innovation as a result of mergers in that sector. 
One example of the Commission taking action under the Merger Regulation to preserve 
competitiveness and consumer choice in the music sector is the Commission's conditional 
clearance decision of the proposed acquisition by Universal Music of EMI's recorded music 
assets. The proposed transaction, as originally notified, would have increased Universal's size 
in a way that would likely have enabled it to impose higher prices and more onerous licensing 
terms on digital music providers. This, in turn, would have negatively affected the 
possibilities for innovative providers to expand or launch new music offerings and would 
                                                            
78 See press release at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1448_en.htm 
79 Including Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for 
electronic communications networks and services (OJ L249, p. 21-26) 
80 Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, judgment of 4 October 2011 
 25 
 
ultimately have reduced consumers' choice for digital music, as well as cultural diversity. To 
remove the Commission's concerns, Universal committed to divest significant assets, 
corresponding to around two thirds of EMI's revenues in the EEA, and including eight of the 
ten EMI top selling artists. Moreover, the commitments provide that at least two thirds of the 
divested assets will have to be sold to a single purchaser, which will have to have the ability 
and the resources to operate in the market as a credible competitor. This case also shows that 
the Commission's merger control activity continued to contribute to the maintenance of 
market conditions supportive of innovation. 
Another example of the Commission intervening under the Merger Regulation to ensure that a 
proposed merger would not have a negative impact on end consumers in terms of higher 
prices is the Commission's conditional clearance decision on 12 December of Hutchison's 
proposed acquisition of Orange in Austria. The proposed transaction would have led to a four 
to three consolidation on the Austrian mobile telecommunications market. The Commission 
found that the merger of two mobile network operators, such as Hutchison and Orange, with a 
particular strength on the data segments, which are of particular importance for the future 
telecoms markets, on a market with high barriers to entry and absence of buyer power would 
have led to a significant price increase for end customers of mobile telecommunication 
services. To address these concerns, the parties submitted commitments, including a 
wholesale access remedy to improve access possibilities for mobile virtual network operators. 
The parties also offered the divestiture of spectrum, which, together with spectrum reserved 
for new entrants by the Austrian regulator in the upcoming auction in 2013, creates the 
possibility for new mobile network operators to enter the Austrian market. 
 3. Financial Services 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
Financial services play an essential role in the economy in transforming short-term savings 
into long-term lending and directing capital where it is most needed. In 2012, the instability 
and difficulties in the financial sector continued.  
In 2012 the European Institutions took initiatives to deepen the Single Market in financial 
services by strengthening the EU financial sector (in line with the EU commitments under the 
G-20) and the European surveillance of the financial system and public finances.  
In December 2012, the European Council agreed on a roadmap for the completion of the 
Economic and Monetary Union, based on deeper integration and reinforced solidarity81. This 
process will begin with the completion, strengthening and implementation of the new 
enhanced economic governance, as well as – in relation to the Banking Union - the adoption 
of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and of the new rules on recovery and resolution and on 
deposit guarantees. It will be completed by the establishment of a single resolution 
mechanism. 
The arrangements related to banking, would allow direct recapitalisation by the European 
Supervisory Mechanism of individual banks which would break the vicious circle of 
contagion between banks and their sovereign. Since such measures need to comply with the 
State aid rules, the European Commission will continue to play a crucial role in the context of 
the envisaged Banking Union. 
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Contribution of EU Competition Policy in tackling the challenges 
Antitrust enforcement contributes to the well-functioning of financial markets with incentives 
for market participants to improve efficiency and meet consumer needs. Combined with well-
designed regulation, antitrust enforcement should enhance transparency and reduce entry 
barriers for new technology and new players.  
Action in the area of financial derivatives  
The European Commission pursued two antitrust investigations in the credit default swaps 
(CDS) market82 which were opened in 2011. The Commission continued to analyse, in 
particular, the cooperation between a number of leading investment banks and an information 
service provider. The purpose of the investigation is to establish whether those players acted 
to preserve their stronghold in the profitable Over-The-Counter (OTC) CDS market by 
hindering the development of alternative CDS trading platforms in a way which infringed EU 
competition law.  
Action to ensure fair access to financial information 
Access to reliable information is crucial for the financial markets. On 20 December 2012 the Commission 
adopted a decision that renders legally binding the commitments offered by Thomson Reuters to create a new 
licence allowing customers, for a monthly fee, to use Reuters Instrument Codes (RICs) for data sourced from 
Thomson Reuters´ competitors. RICs are codes that identify securities and are used by financial institutions to 
retrieve data from Thomson Reuters´ real-time datafeeds. To correctly assess investment opportunities, market 
participants need to access accurate and timely financial data, for example, through consolidated real-time 
datafeeds. The Commission had concerns that Thomson Reuters might have been abusing its dominant position 
in the market for such datafeeds. The decision was preceded by several rounds of commitments offered by 
Thomson Reuters and two market tests. In order to correctly assess investment opportunities, market participants 
need to access accurate and timely financial data, for example through consolidated real-time datafeeds. The 
commitments offered by Thomson Reuters and rendered legally binding by the Commission´s decision will 
enhance competition in this market. Financial institutions that use RICs will be able to switch to alternative 
providers more easily. 
Contributing to seamless, efficient and innovative payment markets 
Payment markets are essential for the Single Market. Regulation, self-regulation and 
competition enforcement must work together to create open, efficient and innovative market 
structures. In 2012, there have been significant advances in all three areas. 
In terms of regulation, the Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) End Date Regulation83 was 
adopted in February. This obliges all users to move from the previous national credit transfer 
and direct debit systems to the new SEPA systems established by the European Payments 
Council by 2014. From a competition perspective, the key element in this regulation is that it 
provides legal clarity on interchange fees for direct debit. This had been a point of much 
discussion with the banking sector for several years, and the regulation specified that 
interchange fees for cross-border transactions are prohibited from November 2012 and for 
domestic transactions from 2017. In January 2012, a Green Paper on cards, internet and 
mobile payments was published. It addressed issues such as lack of market access, diverging 
interchange fees, barriers to cross-border acceptance of card payments, lack of transparency, 
lack of European technical and security standards and governance of the SEPA process. 300 
replies were received and published in June. In October, the Commission announced that in 
the second quarter of 2013 it would propose a revision of the regulatory framework (in 
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particular the Payment Services Directive) and would propose to regulate multilateral 
interchange fees (MIFs) for payment card transactions.  
In payments self-regulation has played an important role, particularly with the creation of the 
European Payments Council, which consists of credit and payment institutions, following the 
introduction of the euro. The SEPA Council was created to represent all stakeholders, but the 
roles and decision making powers of the EPC and SEPA Council remain controversial. In the 
SEPA Regulation the Parliament required a review of the governance arrangements. This was 
included in the Green Paper and it has been much discussed during 2012, including from a 
competition perspective.  
In terms of competition enforcement, in May 2012 the General Court fully upheld84 the 
Commission's decision which had found that MasterCard's MIFs for card payments 
constituted a restriction of Article 101(1) TFEU and that MasterCard had not demonstrated 
that the MIFs were justified on efficiency grounds under Article 101(3). In July, the 
Commission issued a supplementary statement of objections to Visa85 concerning its MIFs for 
credit card payments and the limitations it imposed on cross-border acquiring where 
merchants use banks in other countries to benefit from better conditions and in particular 
lower MIFs. Investigation of the EPC work on standardisation for e-payment systems 
continued. The EPC announced in July 2012 that it would stop its work on the e-Payments 
Framework.  
Antitrust investigations in the financial sector 
In October 2011, the Commission undertook unannounced inspections at the premises of a 
number of companies active in the sector of interest-rate derivative products linked to the 
Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) in a number of Member States, as it had concerns 
that these companies may have violated EU antitrust rules. The Commission started 
investigating these cases as a matter of top priority before the so-called "LIBOR scandal" 
triggered by Barclays on the LIBOR/EURIBOR rate manipulation by a number of banks and 
their employees.  
In 2012, the Commission continued to investigate a number of cases related to the benchmark 
rates of LIBOR, EURIBOR, TIBOR – the Tokyo rate – and with regard to a number of banks 
and brokers. The alleged rate-rigging is a major competition concern as it has to be ensured 
that competition in financial markets takes place on a level-playing field. 
Interbank interest rate benchmarks are systemic benchmarks which are important for the 
transmission of the euro area’s monetary policy. Besides, the integrity of these benchmarks is 
critical to the pricing of many financial instruments such as interest rate derivatives, 
commercial and non-commercial contracts. Any failures may cause losses for investors, 
distort the real economy and undermine market confidence. The importance of financial 
derivatives, in particular, is immense. In 2011, interest-rate derivatives had a gross value of 
many trillions of euros. The products are traded every day on a global basis, involving 
companies such as banks, pension funds and industrial firms seeking to hedge their exposure. 
They play a key role in the management of risk in our economy. 
These are cases that are dealt with worldwide (US, Canada, Australia, South Korea, 
Switzerland, Japan, Brazil, etc.) and on the antitrust, criminal and regulatory law fronts. 
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Taking action to ensure competitive prices to hedge against investment risk 
On 1 February 2012, the Commission prohibited the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse (DB) and New 
York Stock Exchange Euronext (NYX). The transaction was unproblematic in a broad range of markets, 
including the markets for listing, trading and clearing of cash instruments. However, it would have eliminated 
competition and lead to a quasi-monopoly in some derivatives markets, in particular, European single stock and 
equity index derivatives and European interest rate derivatives, where globally DB and NYX are de facto the 
only credible players. The markets for exchange trading and clearing of these derivative instruments is 
characterized by high barriers to entry resulting, in particular, from the closed vertical silo operated by most 
derivatives exchanges. While the transaction would have given rise to certain efficiencies, it was considered that 
these would be insufficient to outweigh the significant harm stemming from the creation of a de facto monopoly, 
namely the loss of actual and potential competition between DB and NYX. The Commission therefore found that 
the merger was likely to lead to higher prices and less innovation for derivatives customers and that the remedies 
proposed by DB and NYX were insufficient to address these concerns. 
In September 2012, the Commission approved, following an in-depth investigation, a joint 
venture between three large UK mobile telephone operators86. The joint venture will, in 
particular, develop a mobile commerce platform including a mobile wallet for payments. The 
investigation revealed that a number of alternatives for mobile payments already existed and 
that the joint venture was unlikely to hinder the emergence of others in the near future. The 
joint venture was therefore cleared without conditions.  
Resolving the situation of banks that cannot become viable without continuing taxpayer support  
In 2012, the extraordinary State aid crisis rules had to be prolonged due to the continuing uncertainties in 
financial markets. With those rules, State aid control continued to ensure a consistent policy response to the 
financial crisis throughout the EU and played an important role in limiting distortions of competition in the 
internal market. 
As has been the case throughout the financial crisis, the Commission in 2012 adopted a considerable number of 
decisions on individual banks in 2012. For example in the case of Dexia on 28 December the Commission 
approved a resolution plan for Dexia submitted on 28 December 2012 by the French, Belgian and 
Luxembourgish authorities. Under the plan, as endorsed in the Commission decision, the Luxemburg part was 
sold and the Belgian lending activities were taken over by Belgium and will be continued as the newly created 
and restructured retail lender Belfius. The French business is to be wound down with the exception of the lending 
activities to municipalities and hospitals, which will be continued through a development bank. In the case of 
BayernLB the Commission approved a plan based on a substantially changed business model and a reduction of 
assets by 50%. The Commission also required the bank to pay back EUR 5 billion of the rescue aid received 
earlier, which exceeded the minimum amount required for the restructuring. 
In a number of Member States, the Commission authorised the prolongation of existing bank 
guarantee and recapitalisation schemes. Moreover, the Commission always verified that aid 
(under schemes or granted on an individual basis) was limited to the minimum necessary and 
that moral hazard was properly addressed by ensuring that shareholders and subordinated debt 
holders were not bailed out through such state interventions. 
The specific situation of Programme Countries 
Extensive financial sector conditionality was included among the policy requirements 
addressed to the Member States that have received international financial assistance, i.e. the 
so-called Programme Countries. In that context, DG Competition continued to collaborate 
with DG ECFIN, the IMF and the ECB regarding the financial sector in programme countries 
in order to ensure that the massive support necessary to keep a number of such institutions 
alive in a difficult macro-economic environment will not result in undue distortions of 
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competition. In addition to the existing programmes in Greece, Portugal and Ireland, a 
programme for the banking sector in Spain was adopted. 
As regards Greece, following the 2011 write downs in the Private Sector Involvement the 
capital of the banks was seriously depleted. To fill the resulting capital needs, an increased 
budget of EUR 50 billion for aiding banks was agreed. EUR 18 billion of those funds was 
advanced to the four main Greek banks (National Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank, Eurobank and 
Piraeus bank) in May 2012. On 27 July 2012, the Commission temporarily approved the 
bridge recapitalisations while at the same time initiating formal investigation procedures. 
Moreover, in 2012, the consolidation of the Greek banking sector started to take shape. The 
Agricultural Bank of Greece (ATE) was resolved with a transfer of its good assets and 
deposits to Piraeus Bank and the previously French-owned banks Emporiki and Geniki were 
acquired by Alpha and Piraeus bank respectively. 
In 2011, the banks in Ireland were recapitalised in the context of the EU/IMF Programme, and 
a number of actions to restore their viability were identified. In 2012, DG Competition 
continued to monitor the implementation by Bank of Ireland of its commitments as well as the 
progress of Allied Irish Banks and Permanent TSB to deleverage their balance sheets. 
In 2011 the EU and the IMF agreed to a EUR 78 billion support package for Portugal. To 
strengthen confidence in the financial sector, the Programme requires banks to achieve high 
levels of capital. While Banco Espírito Santo managed to raise all the capital it needed from 
private investors, Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Millennium BCP, Banco Português de 
Investimento and Banif needed public support and their restructuring plans are currently being 
assessed by the Commission. In March 2012, a decision was taken regarding the restructuring 
aid granted to Banco Português de Negócios, which entailed its integration into Banco BIC 
Português. 
In July 2012, the EU and the ECB concluded a Memorandum of Understanding for a sector 
programme for the banking sector in Spain. It made Spanish banks subject to a rigorous stress 
test over a three-year period. Banks with a capital shortfall that could not be met by 
mobilising private resources were recapitalised with programme funds and were subject to 
restructuring under State aid rules. Two groups of banks were involved in that process: the 
first group was composed of banks already controlled by the Spanish authorities: BFA/Bankia, 
Catalunya Caixa, Nova Caixa Galicia and Banco de Valencia, for which the restructuring 
plans were approved in November 2012. The second group was composed of other banks that 
needed State aid following the stress test: Ceiss, Banco Mare Nostrum, Caja 3 and Liberbank. 
The restructuring plans of these banks were approved in December 2012. 
Cyprus and the Cypriot banks lost access to international funding markets and requested 
external financial assistance in June 2012. The Cypriot banks faced significant capital 
shortfalls due to their large exposure to Greek sovereign and private sector debt and excess 
lending to the domestic real estate sector.  
 4. Basic industries and Manufacturing 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
The EU and the Member States shall, in accordance with Article 173 TFEU, ensure that the 
conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Union's industry exist. For that purpose, in 
accordance with a system of open and competitive markets, their actions shall be aimed at, 
among other things, speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural changes as well as 
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fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and 
technological development. The Treaty framework was given more shape in the 
Communication "An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era: Putting 
Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage" adopted by the Commission in October 
2010. Industry accounts for four-fifths of Europe's exports and private sector R&D 
investment87. 
Contribution of EU competition policy in tackling the challenges  
During 2012 EU competition policy was applied in the area of manufacturing and basic 
industry in line with the EU´s industrial policy centred around competitiveness; for example, 
in the field of State aid, State aid rules were adopted which enable the Member States to 
support industrial sectors at significant risk of carbon leakage in the context of the third phase 
of the European Emission´s System (ETS)88. The Commission´s actions against cartels and 
abuses of dominant positions are particularly beneficial to European manufacturing and basic 
industries since such enforcement actions deters and sanctions anticompetitive conduct 
resulting in excessive input prices (see for example the Commission´s fining decisions in the 
Cathode ray tubes cartel case89 and the Freight Forwarding cartel90, which entailed 
surcharges for freight forwarding services by air along key trade lines between Europe and 
North American and Asian trade lines).  
Such considerations also guide the Commission's assessment of mergers. On 7 November 
2012, following an in-depth review, the Commission approved, subject to conditions, the 
Finnish firm Outokumpu's acquisition of Inoxum91, the stainless steel division of 
ThyssenKrupp of Germany. The approval is conditional upon the divestiture of Inoxum's 
stainless steel production facility in Terni, Italy. The Commission had concerns that the 
combination of the two largest suppliers of cold rolled steel products would have given the 
merged entity the power to raise prices. The commitments offered address those concerns. 
Stainless steel is a key material for a wide range of products, from household goods to 
industrial equipment, and an essential input for many European industries. The divestment of 
the Italian Terni plant ensures that the creation of a new European market leader will not be 
detrimental to consumers and businesses in Europe. 
The Commission's in-depth investigation focused on the production of cold rolled stainless 
steel products in the European Economic Area (EEA). In that market, the merger will 
combine the first and the second largest supplier. The transaction, as initially notified, would 
have created a player three times as big as Aperam of Luxembourg and five times as big as 
Acerinox of Spain, the closest competitors, and respectively the third and fourth player in the 
market. The Commission's investigation found that while imports account for an appreciable 
part of the EEA market, they are insufficient to constrain price increases, because they are 
generally not considered fully substitutable by final customers. Moreover, despite their level 
of spare capacity, it is likely that the two main European competitors of the parties, Aperam 
and Acerinox, would have found it more profitable to follow price increases by the merged 
entity rather than competing sufficiently aggressively to prevent such increases. Price 
                                                            
87 Industrial Policy Communication Update of 10 October 2012 (COM(2012) 582 final) 
88 Press release of 22.5.2012, IP/12/498 
89 Case COMP/39437 TV and computer monitor tubes, press release of 5.12.2012, IP/12/1317 
90 Case COMP/39462 Freight forwarding, Summary of Commission Decision of 28 March 2012 relating to a 
proceeding under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 53 of the EEA 
Agreement 
91 Case COMP/M.6471 OUTOKUMPU / INOXUM, press release of 7.11.2012, IP/12/1185 
 31 
 
increases resulting from the transaction, as initially notified, would have likely been much 
higher than any potential synergies. 
Two weeks after the Outokumpu decision, on 22 November 2012, the European Commission 
cleared under the EU Merger Regulation the proposed acquisition of Xstrata, the world's fifth 
largest metals and mining group, by Glencore92, the world's leading metals and thermal coal 
trader. The clearance was conditional on the termination of Glencore's off-take arrangements 
for zinc metal in the European Economic Area (EEA) with Nyrstar, the world's largest zinc 
metal producer, and the divestiture of Glencore's minority shareholding in Nyrstar. The 
Commission had concerns that the merged entity would have the ability and incentive to raise 
prices for zinc metal, an important input for many EU industries. The commitments ensure 
that competition in the European zinc metal market is preserved, so that European customers 
such as steel galvanisers and car makers can continue to produce valuable consumer goods at 
low prices and good quality. Without the commitments, the merged entity would have had an 
even greater ability and incentive to control the level of zinc metal supplies in the EEA, for 
example by exporting material to LME93-certified warehouses outside the EEA or otherwise 
withholding supplies from the EEA market. The reaction by competitors, including imports, 
would not have been sufficient to prevent the risk of a significant price increase for zinc 
metal.  
In the area of State aid, on 11 July 2012 the Commission opened a formal investigation on 11 
July 2012 into whether notified regional aid in favour of an investment project by German car 
maker Porsche in Leipzig, Saxony, is in line with EU State aid rules. Given the high market 
shares of Volkswagen-Porsche and the capacity increase brought about by the investment, the 
Commission has to undertake an in-depth assessment of the aid. The Commission will check 
whether the aid is necessary and proportionate to provide an incentive for the investment and 
whether its contribution to regional development outweighs the distortion of competition and 
trade. The project aims at manufacturing a new passenger car model. The total investment 
costs amount to EUR 521.56 million. Germany intends to support the project with EUR 
43.67 million in the form of a direct grant and an investment premium. The investment project 
started in April 2011 and its completion is planned for 2014. Leipzig is eligible for regional 
aid to further the development of certain economic activities or sectors, pursuant to Article 
107(3)(c) of the TFEU. 
Sanctioning cartels which raise input costs for European manufacturers 
On 28 March 201294, the Commission fined nine European producers of mountings for windows a total of EUR 
86 million for operating a cartel by which they agreed on common yearly price increases. The collusion lasted 
from November 1999 to July 2007 and affected European buyers of windows across the whole EEA. For most of 
the parties to this case, mountings for windows constitute a large fraction of their turnover. For this reason, the 
fines of nearly all parties would have been capped at 10% of their worldwide turnover. Exceptionally, the 
Commission exercised its discretion in accordance with point 37 of its Guidelines on fines and reduced the fines 
in a way that takes into account the concentration of the total turnover in the sales of cartelized products as well 
as differences between the parties in view of their individual participation in the infringement. 
                                                            
92 Case COMP/M.6541 GLENCORE / XSTRATA, press release of 22.11.2012, IP/12/1252 
93 London Metals Exchange 
94 Case COMP/39452 Mountings for windows and window-doors, Press Release of 28.3.2012, IP/12/313, 
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On 26 June 2012, the Commission re-imposed fines on Mitsubishi Electric Corporation and Toshiba 
Corporation for their participation in the Gas Insulated Switchgear cartel95. The fines originally imposed on two 
companies by the Commission in January 2007 were annulled by the General Court on account of the 
Commission´s use of 2001 as reference year in calculating the fines while upholding all the other findings of the 
Commission on the infringement committed by those companies and their liability. The June 2012 decision thus 
ensured that Mitsubishi and Toshiba received an appropriate fine for their participation in the cartel. 
 5. The Agri-food industry 
Overview of key challenges in the sector  
The food supply chain connects three important sectors of the European economy: (1) 
agricultural production: (2) food processing and (3) distribution (wholesale and retail). They 
play a significant role in Europe's economic, social, and political life and are considerable 
contributors to EU added value, trade and employment, especially in rural areas96. Food 
purchases also represent a significant part of the household expenditure97. 
Agriculture and fisheries are among the major policies of the EU. In both sectors, a 
comprehensive reform is underway that will have a significant impact upon the food chain 
and consumers. The ongoing reform has also fuelled the debate on the position of different 
actors in the food chain in general and the relationship between the farming community and 
retail level in particular.  
On 1 January 2012, a Food Task Force was set up in DG COMP to better focus on the 
developments in this increasingly topical sector. 
At EU level, the Commission set up in 2010 a High Level Forum for a Better Functioning 
Food Supply Chain (HLF)98 in 2010. The HLF brings together a number of Commission 
initiatives in different policy fields which seek to address the challenges in the sector. It has 
established a number of expert platforms to focus on different aspects of the food chain. The 
work of the platform on Business-to-Business (B2B) contractual practices deals with concerns 
about uneven bargaining power in the food supply chain, which might also involve 
competition aspects. In December 2012, all operators but farmers agreed on an 
implementation mechanism of the code of good practices agreed in 2011, which will be 
introduced in the second quarter of 2013.  
Given the many complaints it has received and the reports by some national competition 
authorities (NCAs) that concentration and practices in the chain may be negatively affecting 
choice and innovation in the food supply chain, DG COMP has designed and launched the 
tender for a retail study99 to assess the evolution and drivers of the evolution of choice and 
innovation. The study will (1) provide quantitative evidence into the Impact Assessment that 
                                                            
95 Case COMP/39966 Gas Insulated Switchgear re-adoption, Prohibition Decision of 27.6.2012, C(2012) 4381 
final 
96 For an overview, see the Report on the Competitiveness of the European Agro-Food Industry of 17 March 
2009 (“Competitiveness Report”), p. 59, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/ 
sectors/food/files/high_level_group_2008/documents_hlg/final_report_hlg_17_03_09_en.pdf 
97 The share of food and non-alcoholic beverages in the household budget differs across countries. For EU27 it 
accounted for almost 13%; http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-13-002/EN/KS-SF-13-
002-EN.PDF 
98 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/food/competitiveness/forum_food/index_en.htm; 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-941_en.htm 
99 COMP/2012/015 study on "The economic impact of modern retail on choice and innovation in the EU food 
sector", published in the Official Journal OJ/S S244 on 19.12.2012 (Reference: 2012/S - 244 400412) 
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the Commission will carry out in 2013 on possible actions (including possibly regulation) at 
EU level on unfair commercial practices, and (2) build further on the work of the NCAs to 
find out whether certain local areas and/or specific product categories face competition 
problems.  
The reforms of the Common Fisheries (CFP) and Agricultural Policies (CAP) put forward by 
the Commission in 2011 have important repercussions for competition in these sectors100. In 
particular, the CAP rules play a significant role for competition in the upstream food supply 
chain. To remedy the perceived lack of bargaining power of the farmers, the CAP proposal 
seeks to strengthen the role of Producer Organisations (POs) in all sectors of agricultural 
production. As the members of POs are independent agricultural producers and their 
production is integrated to varying degrees in the POs, it is essential to ensure that the POs 
function in a pro-competitive way. The proposal confirms that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
apply to agricultural production, and keeps the current, limited derogations from Article 101 
to agreements between farmers essentially in their present form.  
The amendments put forward in the European Parliament draft report on the CAP legislative 
proposals go considerably beyond the Commission's proposal to exempt agreements and 
practices of farmers from competition rules. These amendments contain measures that e.g. 
would confer to POs powers to, under certain circumstances, fix prices, control output and 
adopt far-reaching crisis measures without any antitrust control101. 
Contribution of EU competition policy in tackling the challenges 
The Commission, in close cooperation with the NCAs, has been an active participant in the 
legislative process advocating a procompetitive policy vis-à-vis other actors in the legislative 
process and the actors of the food chain. 
Enforcement and cooperation with the NCAs 
Agricultural and food markets are often national or regional in scope. Therefore, NCAs play a 
key role in applying competition law in this sector. DG Competition has cooperated closely 
with NCAs within the framework of the European Competition Network (ECN) in order to 
further develop a coherent and common approach and to ensure that food markets remain 
competitive and work efficiently. In this context, on 21 December 2012, the Heads of the 
European Competition Authorities adopted a resolution on the CAP in which they underlined 
that the enforcement of competition rules helps to ensure a productive, strong and effective 
agricultural sector. 
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Report by the European Competition Network: competition enforcement intensified after the food price 
crisis in 2007102 
On 24 May 2012 the Commission published a report of the ECN on the enforcement of competition law in the 
food sector by competition authorities across Europe. The report showed that the food sector has been a priority 
of competition authorities over the last few years and that their action has intensified since the food price crisis 
broke out in 2007. From 2004 to 2011, NCAs have investigated more than 180 antitrust cases, taken close to 
1,300 merger decisions and undertaken more than 100 monitoring actions. The report also made clear that 
antitrust and merger activity has benefited all levels in the chain, in particular farmers, suppliers and consumers. 
The majority of cases concerned processing and manufacturing and, to a lesser extent, the retail level. More than 
50 cartels involving price fixing, market and customer allocation as well as the exchange of sensitive business 
information have been prohibited, as have exclusionary practices that were to the detriment of farmers or 
suppliers. 
Merger decisions by the Commission in the food sector  
The food sector is subject to on-going globalisation and consolidation, as reflected in the 
number of mergers the Commission dealt with in 2012. Particular attention was paid to the 
sugar markets. The current high prices and scarcity of sugar across the EU make it all the 
more important to maintain competition in the already concentrated European sugar markets 
and to ensure that supplies are available to consumers at reasonable prices. In the Südzucker / 
ED&F MAN decision103 on 16 May 2012 the Commission, following an in-depth review, 
cleared on 16 May 2012 under the EU Merger Regulation the proposed acquisition of control 
by Südzucker of Germany, Europe's largest sugar producer, over ED&F MAN of the UK, the 
second largest sugar trader worldwide, which is also active in sugar production. The approval 
was made conditional upon the divestiture of ED&F MAN's interests in the Brindisi refinery, 
the biggest and most modern production facility in Italy. Those commitments ensure that the 
Brindisi refinery will remain a viable and competitive force in Italy, independent from the 
merged entity.  
 6. The Pharmaceutical and health services sector 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
Both pharmaceuticals and health exhibit a number of common characteristics: the prescribers 
of the goods or services in question (i.e. the physicians) are different from the consumers (i.e. 
the patients). Similarly, the payers (i.e. usually sickness funds within the Member States) are 
different from the prescribers and the consumers. Thus, prescribers and consumers will be less 
price sensitive than in other markets. Furthermore, the pharmaceutical and health care sectors 
are both fragmented by national regulations regarding authorisation, pricing and 
reimbursement status of the goods or services concerned. That fragmentation of the Single 
Market can give rise to artificial barriers to entry. EU competition policy has a key role to 
play in contributing to competitive outcomes, cost-containment and innovation in this 
important area. 
The pharmaceutical sector is highly regulated and R&D driven. On the supply side, originator 
companies aim to bring innovative products to the market. The patent system provides the 
legislative framework allowing the companies to reap the benefits of their successful R&D 
activities. During patent protection, competition mainly takes place on innovation between 
                                                            
102 ECN activities in the food sector - Report on competition law enforcement and market monitoring activities 
by European competition authorities in the food sector (24 May 2012) Drafted by the ECN food subgroup, 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/food_report_en.pdf See MEMO/12/373 of 24.5.2012 
103 Case COMP/M.6286 SÜDZUCKER / ED&F MAN, press release of 16.5.2012, IP/12/486 
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originator companies. Upon loss of exclusivity, generic companies typically enter the market 
with much lower price bio-equivalent versions of the originator products. Generic entry on 
patent expiry entails savings for public budgets. The threat of generic entry also incentivises 
originator companies to pursue their R&D efforts to develop new and innovative proprietary 
medicines. Thus, at the point of loss of exclusivity, competition on price is added to 
competition on innovation between originator and generic companies or between generic 
companies. 
A key issue of concern from the perspective of competition policy is conduct which is aimed 
at unduly delaying or blocking generic entry or the development and launch of innovative 
medicines. Such practices were analysed in general terms in the Commission's sector inquiry, 
the findings of which were published in the final report in 2009104. As set out in the final 
report, such practices can inter alia involve misuses of regulatory systems applicable to the 
pharmaceutical market, misuses of the patent system and misuses of patent rights (e.g. in 
connection with patent settlement agreements). The judgment by the Court of Justice on 6 
December 2012 in the AstraZeneca case, upholding to a very large extent the Commission's 
finding decision from 2005, confirmed that misuses of the patent system and the regulatory 
system applicable to the pharmaceutical market may, in certain circumstances, constitute 
abuses of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. 
Improving competition in the pharmaceutical sector may also require improvements in the 
regulatory framework. For example on 1 March 2012 the Commission tabled a proposal to 
repeal and replace the Council Directive 89/10/EEC (also known as the Transparency 
Directive)105. The aim is to make sure that medicines enter the market faster by further 
streamlining and reduce the duration of national decisions on pricing and reimbursement of 
medicines. In the future, such decisions should be taken within 120 days for innovative 
medicines, as a rule, and for generic medicinal products within only 30 days, instead of 180 
days as is currently the case. The sector inquiry concluded in 2009 had identified national 
pricing and reimbursement decisions as a bottleneck to market entry.  
The organisation of the health care sector is primarily the responsibility of Member States 
under Article 168 TFEU. However, to the extent that the activities in question involve the 
offering of goods or services in the market106, the provision of health care goods or services is 
generally subject to EU competition rules, as reflected in the Commission's antitrust decision 
of 2010 sanctioning the French Association of Pharmacists (ONP)107. 
Contribution of EU competition policy in tackling the challenges  
In 2012, the Commission continued to investigate the pharmaceutical sector to detect and 
pursue possible collusive or otherwise anticompetitive conduct by originator and generic 
companies. Anticompetitive conduct can take place in the context of competition between 
originator firms, competition between originator, generic firms and between generic firms. In 
particular, as a follow up to the sector inquiry concluded in 2009, it launched investigations in 
several individual cases. 
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As regards possible anticompetitive conduct delaying generic market entry, the Commission 
issued statements of objections in two cases in 2012. According to the statement of objections 
in the Perindopril case, the Commission takes the preliminary view that Les Laboratoires 
Servier and several generic competitors entered into agreements where in exchange for 
payments by Servier the generic companies agreed not to enter the market with their cheaper 
generic products and/or not to further challenge the validity of the patents that protected 
Servier's more expensive medicine. In addition, Servier, in the Commission's preliminary 
view, bought technologies that would have enabled generic competitors to enter the market. 
According to the statement of objections in the Citalopram case, the Commission took the 
preliminary view that Lundbeck and several generic competitors concluded agreements at a 
time when generic entry became possible in principle and where, in exchange for value 
transfers from Lundbeck, the generic companies abstained from entering the market with 
generic citalopram. 
Two further cases, Cephalon108 and Fentanyl109, which were opened in 2011 and continued to 
be investigated during 2012, predominantly concern agreements and contractual arrangements 
that potentially delayed market entry of generic medicines, i.e. potential infringements of 
Article 101 TFEU. The Commission also pursued a number of investigations into cases of 
generic delay where no official openings have taken place yet110. 
In addition, in 2012, the Commission ceased its antitrust investigation into the pharmaceutical 
companies AstraZeneca and Nycomed111. The investigation focused on suspected individual 
or joint action to delay the market entry of generic medicines. 
The sector inquiry and its follow-up have not chilled recourse to prima facie unproblematic patent 
settlements  
The European Commission continued to monitor the market and obstacles to generic entry with particular 
emphasis on patent settlements. Following the sector inquiry, the Commission had already carried out two 
exercises of monitoring patent settlements in the EU in 2010 and 2011. A third monitoring exercise was carried 
out in 2012. It confirmed the positive trend of potentially problematic patent settlements stabilizing at a low 
number. In fact the share of potentially problematic settlements decreased to 11% of the overall number of 
settlements in the period of 2011, compared to 22% in the period of January 2000-June 2008, (i.e. as investigated 
during the sector inquiry)112. At the same time, resource to prima facie unproblematic patent settlement types 
continued to increase by 500% in comparison with the results of the sector inquiry. 
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 7. Transport 
Overview of key challenges in the sector  
The transport sector is one of the engines of the Single Market. It enables the free flow of 
people, goods and services within the Single Market, thereby contributing to the 
competitiveness of European industry and the achievement of the Europe 2020 objectives.  
The transport sector provides essential inputs for other economic activities. Transportation 
costs represent on average 10-15% of the costs of a finished product. That figure includes the 
costs of own account transport operations as well as the costs of purchasing transport services 
from specialised companies. Companies whose main activity is the provision of transport (and 
transport related) services generate around 5% of EU GDP. They employ more than 10 
million persons, which is around 5% of the EU labour force.  
To improve the performance of the transport sector, the EU has promoted the integration and 
liberalisation of transport markets. There is much variation between the different transport 
sectors regarding the speed and scope of the liberalisation process. While the air and maritime 
transport markets have been open to competition for many years, the market for international 
passenger services by rail was only liberalised in 2010. Markets for national rail passenger 
services have not yet been opened to competition in many Member States. Railway services 
are also perceived by consumers as unsatisfactory. In the 2012 Consumer Markets 
Scoreboard, train services ranked 27th among 30 consumer services markets113. 
An overarching objective of rail transport policy is to increase the share of freight and 
passengers transported via rail. 
Contribution of EU competition policy in tackling the challenges 
Fighting remaining regulatory constraints and entry barriers  
Competition policy aims to ensure that markets operate efficiently to the benefit of the end 
consumer. This is particularly important in the transport sector where newly competitive 
markets have been emerging as a result of the market integration and liberalisation process. 
On the one hand, the Single Market has created new opportunities for cross-border entrants, 
resulting in increased competition on fares and services offered between different transport 
service providers. On the other hand, regulatory constraints and entry barriers in the sector 
remain quite common, contributing to a concentration of supply and a weakening of 
competition. In addition, State aid given to transport companies may lead to undue distortions 
of competition. 
Potential anticompetitive effects resulting from increased concentration in air transport sector  
In air transport, the emergence of low-cost carriers has contributed to a significant reduction 
in fares and a proliferation in the number of regional airports served, which in turn resulted in 
an increase in passenger numbers. The economic and financial crisis, however, caused a sharp 
drop in traffic. As a result, many regional airports in Europe are making losses and only 
survive thanks to the subsidies they receive from local authorities. The large European hub 
airports, on the other hand, remain congested. The long term outlook indicates that the share 
of air transport will continue to grow and that more and more airports will become congested, 
at least during peak hours. In addition, the crisis allowed the strongest airlines to consolidate 
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their position as market leaders. Some of the smaller and less efficient airlines have exited the 
market, been restructured or merged into larger entities. Most of the remaining European 
airlines have decided to join one of the three big alliances – Star, SkyTeam and oneworld – as 
national restrictions on ownership and control prevent cross-border consolidation through 
airline mergers. The main competition concerns relate to the concentration of supply on 
certain routes resulting from airline mergers within the EU and the possible anticompetitive 
impact of different forms of collaboration within alliances, which range from bilateral 
codeshare114 agreements to full-fledged joint ventures. In cases involving transatlantic 
alliances, the Commission worked closely with the US Department of Transportation. 
One of the purposes of merger control in air transport is to ensure that airlines do not undo the 
pro-competitive effects of liberalisation by acquiring close competitors. On 10 February 2012, 
the International Airlines Group (IAG), the holding company of British Airways and Iberia, 
notified its intention to acquire British Midlands Limited (bmi), which had a strong presence 
in the UK as well. On 30 March 2012, the Commission decided115 to approve the proposed 
transaction following IAG's commitment to release 14 daily slot pairs at London Heathrow to 
competitors and to carry connecting passengers feeding long-haul flights of competing 
airlines. On 24 July 2012, Ryanair notified116 its third attempt to take over Aer Lingus, its 
main rival at Dublin airport. In November 2012, the Commission issued a statement of 
objections outlining its preliminary assessment of the impact of the proposed transaction.  
On 23 January 2012, the Commission re-opened its investigation117 into the SkyTeam 
alliance. The new investigation is more limited in scope and focuses exclusively on the joint-
venture agreement between Delta, Air France/KLM and Alitalia, which co-operate closely on 
prices, capacity and schedules for passenger air transport services on the transatlantic market. 
The investigation118 of the Star Alliance transatlantic joint-venture was opened in 2009 and 
has reached a more advanced stage. On 21 December 2012, the Commission decided to test 
the commitments proposed by Lufthansa, Air Canada and United Airlines. The commitments 
included slot releases at the Frankfurt and New York airports, competitors' access to the 
parties' connecting traffic, and the ability of competitors to combine their fares with those of 
the parties. The Commission also continued monitoring the commitments offered by British 
Airways, Iberia and American Airlines in the oneworld investigation119, which was concluded 
in 2010. All three alliances are therefore currently under investigation or have been 
investigated by the Commission. 
Increased scrutiny of State aid to regional airports and low cost carriers  
In 2012 the Commission increased its scrutiny of aid granted to regional airports and low-cost carriers. Against 
that backdrop, the Commission adopted 16 decisions to open a new formal investigation procedure or to extend 
the scope of pending investigations of investment aid to airlines or regional airports120. Most of those cases 
involved discount schemes on airport charges given to low cost carriers, often in combination with marketing 
agreements of doubtful value to the airports. The Commission also adopted three final State aid decisions, 
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concerning notably Tampere-Pirkkala airport and its agreement with Ryanair, the Irish travel tax and the 
financing arrangements concerning Munich airport Terminal 2121. In the first of those decisions, the Commission 
considered that the agreement between Tampere-Pirkkala airport and Ryanair was concluded on terms that a 
private investor operating under market conditions would have accepted. In particular, the Commission was able 
to conclude that the diversification of airlines operating from the airport, a better allocation of resources as well 
as the reduced overcapacity positively contributed to the operational and financial situation of the airport and 
increased the market value of the airport for its shareholders. 
As regards cartels, in the Freight Forwarding case122 the Commission fined 15 companies a 
total of EUR 169 million on 28 March 2012. The decision sanctioned four separate cartels 
aimed at fixing prices and other trading conditions for international air freight forwarding 
services. Four different surcharges and charging mechanisms applied by freight forwarders to 
the air transport of goods on important trade lanes (in particular the Europe-USA and the 
China/Hong Kong-Europe lanes) were subject to the collusive arrangements. The individual 
infringements took place in different geographical areas during various periods between 2002 
and 2007. The infringements were relatively short in duration, between five months and one 
year and nine months.  
Competition concerns resulting from State support and barriers to entry in rail transport  
An overarching objective of rail transport policy is to increase the share of freight and 
passengers transported via rail. Within this context, the Commission received a number of 
notifications of State aid for investment and operating expenditures in rail transport. In 2012, 
the Commission adopted six decisions approving aid for the construction of sidings and 
intermodal terminals, for rolling stock specific to combined transport as well as for offsetting 
network access charges123.  
According to current EU regulation, non-discriminatory access to rail infrastructure should be 
ensured for railway undertakings. Nevertheless, from a competition policy perspective the 
Commission is concerned that railway undertakings that are controlled by holdings with 
subsidiaries that are also active on rail transport markets will leverage their position as 
subsidiary of the holding and provider of associated services to hamper potential competitors 
and benefit other subsidiaries of the holding. The Commission has been investigating such 
issues in the case against Deutsche Bahn, the German railway incumbent124. The Commission 
initiated proceedings in the Deutsche Bahn case on 13 June 2012 following unannounced 
inspections in March 2011. 
The Deutsche Bahn case concerns the supply of traction current by DB Energie, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Deutsche Bahn. DB Energie is the only provider of an input that is 
indispensable for railway undertakings to operate in Germany: traction current, i.e. the special 
type of electricity that powers trains. The Commission considers that the pricing system used 
by DB Energie for selling traction current to railway undertakings may constitute an abuse of 
a dominant position on the market for the supply of traction current and thereby infringe 
Article 102 TFEU.  
Access to port facilities and fiscal advantages in maritime transport  
In maritime transport, competition policy ensures, inter alia, that shipping companies have 
equal access to essential (port) infrastructures and benefit equally from fiscal advantages 
offered by the public sector in light of their high exposure to competition from third countries.  
                                                            
121 See IP/12/833 of 25.7.2012 and MEMO/12/597 of 25.7.2012, IP/12/1057 of 3.10.2012 
122 COMP/39462 
123 See for example IP/12/831 of 25.7.2012 
124 Cases COMP/39678 Deutsche Bahn I, COMP/39731 Deutsche Bahn II and COMP/39915 Deutsche Bahn III 
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During its investigation of the acquisition of the Swedish sea port terminal Älvsborg by the 
shipping company DFDS and the terminal operator C.RO Ports, the Commission addressed 
concerns that rivals of the merging entities might find their access to the Port of Gothenburg 
restricted or even closed off completely. On 2 April 2012, the Commission decided125 to 
approve the acquisition because: (1) the Port has alternative terminals to the one operated by 
Älvsborg and (2) the concession agreement concluded between the Gothenburg Port 
Authority and Älvsborg requires a non-discriminatory treatment of all shipping companies. 
In 2012, the Commission approved the prolongation of Swedish and Dutch State aid schemes 
reducing the social charges borne by shipping companies, because it considered them to be 
compatible with the Single Market126. The Commission also initiated a formal investigation of 
the Maltese tonnage tax as it had doubts that not only genuine shipping companies were 
benefiting from that special State aid regime, but also non-maritime companies127. Finally, the 
Commission approved a modification of a Spanish scheme128 providing for early depreciation 
of certain assets acquired via a financial leasing. The Commission found that limiting the 
scope of that measure to tailor-made assets with a construction period of at least 12 months 
makes it possible to address the concerns of the Spanish shipbuilding sector without distorting 
competition in the Single Market. As the scheme was otherwise available to all companies 
with respect to all categories of assets and without any distinction as to the origin of the asset, 
the Commission considered that the scheme did not amount to State aid.  
Public consultations on antitrust and State aid guidelines in the transport sector  
In December 2012 the Commission decided – following a public consultation – to let the 2008 
Maritime Antitrust Guidelines lapse with effect from 26 September 2013. The decision was 
also taken against the background of the adoption of more recent horizontal rules – which 
apply across different sectors – which are more up to date in terms of legal and economic 
standards, notably the Horizontal Guidelines from 2010 which contain a chapter on 
information exchanges, i.e. the main focus of the Maritime Antitrust Guidelines.  
In 2012, the Commission also carried out a public consultation on the application of the 
guidelines on State aid to maritime transport. The Commission will decide on the follow up of 
that public consultation when the responses are fully analysed. 
The responses to the public consultation on the application of the guidelines on State aid in 
the aviation sector carried out in 2011 were analysed with a view to the adoption of new 
guidelines in 2013, which will need to better address the public financing of regional airports 
and airlines. In that context, the Commission will take into account the role of regional 
airports for accessibility and local development while limiting the distortions of competition 
and avoiding a duplication of unprofitable airports and a waste of public resources. 
  
 
                                                            
125 Case COMP/M.6305 DFDS/C.RO Ports/Älvsborg, IP/12/343, 2.4.2012 
126 Cases COMP/SA.33609 Sweden Maritime Transport Aid, OJ C142, 26.1.2012 and COMP/SA.34004 
Netherlands Prolongation of the extension of reduced remittances for maritime navigation to commercial 
cruising vessels, adopted on 10.5.2012 
127 Case COMP/SA.33829 Tonnage tax scheme and other State measures in favour of shipping companies in 
Malta, IP/12/843, 25.7.2012 
128 Case COMP/SA.34736 Early depreciation of assets acquired through a financial leasing, IP/12/1241, 
20.11.2012 
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ANNEX 1: List of DG Competition initiatives adopted under CWP 2012 
• Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading scheme post-2012 - SWD(2012) 130 final, SWD(2012) 131 final 
• Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 25 April 2012 on the application of 
Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de 
minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general economic interest 
• Communication on EU State Aid Modernisation - COM/2012/ 209 final 
• Report on Competition Policy 2011 – COM(2012) 253 final* 
• Communication on short term export credit insurance – (2012/C 398/02) 
• EU Guidelines for the application of state aid rules in relation to the rapid deployment 
of broadband networks - C(2012) 9609/2 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/broadband_guidelines_en.pdf 
• State aid Scoreboard: Autumn 2012 update129 – COM(2012) 778 final* 
 
 
* relates to other measures not included in the CWP 2012 
 
 
 
                                                            
129 From 2012 only once/year 
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ANNEX 2: List of State aid banking cases 
 
DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION IN 2012130 
 
AUSTRIA 
Type of measure / Beneficiary 
 
Type of Decision Date of adoption 
SA.31883 Restructuring of Österreichische 
Volksbanken AG 
Final decision 
IP/12/982 
19 September 2012 
SA.34716 Recapitalisation of Hypo Tirol Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/1067 
4 October 2012 
SA.32554 Temporary approval of an emergency 
recapitalisation in favour of Hypo Group Alpe Adria 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/1315 
5 December 2012 
 
BELGIUM 
Belgium 
SA.9833 (MC11/2009) KBC – phasing out and 
divestment 
Decision not to raise objections 
EXME/12/21.12 
20 December 2012 
 
Belgium/France/Luxembourg 
SA.33760, SA.33763, SA.33764 (2011/C) Dexia – 
prolongation of guarantees and extension of the in 
depth investigation 
IP/12/523 31 May 2012 
SA.34925 Dexia – Increase of guarantee ceiling IP/12/578 6 June 2012 
SA.34925-SA.34927- SA.34928 (2012/C) Dexia – 
prolongation of guarantees 
MEX/12/0926 26 September 2012 
SA.33751, SA.33760, SA.33763, SA.33764 
(2011/C) and SA.30521 (MC2/2010) Dexia and 
Belfius 
IP/12/1447 28 December 2012
 
CYPRUS 
SA.34827 Rescue recapitalisation of Cyprus Popular 
Bank (ex-Marfin) 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/958 
13 September 2012 
SA.35499 State guarantee scheme for Cypriot banks Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/1171 
6 November 2012 
 
DENMARK 
SA.35741 Prolongation EXME/12/14.12 14 December 2012 
SA.34943 Prolongation of the winding-up scheme 
and extension of the guarantee scheme for merging 
banks 
EXME/12/26.06 26 June 2012 
SA 33485 Restructuring plan of Amagerbanken  EXME/12/01.25 25 January 2012 
SA.34227 Guarantees for merging banks EXME/12/02.17 17 February 2012
SA.34423 Support for the merger of Vestjysk Bank 
and Aarhus Lokalbank 
Decision not to raise objections 
EXME/12/04.25 
25 April 2012 
SA.34445 (2012/N) The transfer of property-related 
assets from FIH to the FSC 
IP/12/723 29 June 2012 
 
GERMANY 
SA.34345 Reactivation  EXME/12/05.03 5 March 2012 
SA.34897 Prolongation  EXME/12/29.06 29 June 2012 
SA.35748 Prolongation EXME/12/07.12 7 December 2012 
                                                            
130 As a general rule, aid schemes are reviewable six months after approval. Some individual decisions are 
subject to a review and possible restructuring plan 
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SA.34539 (2012/N) Amendment of restructuring 
plan of Commerzbank  
EXME/12/03.30 30 March 2012 
SA.34381 Restructuring of NordLB Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/838 
25 July 2012 
SA.28487 Restructuring aid to BayernLB Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/847 
25 July 2012 
 
GREECE 
SA 34149 Prolongation EXME 12/06.02 6 February 2012 
SA.35002 Prolongation  6 July 2012 
SA 34148 Prolongation EXME 12/06.02 6 February 2012 
SA.34115 Resolution of T bank IP/12/485 16 May 2012 
SA.34488 Restructuring aid to Proton bank through 
creation and capitalisation of Nea Proton 
IP/12/854 27 July 2012 
SA.34823 HFSF Recapitalisation commitment to 
Alpha Bank 
IP/12/860 27 July 2012 
SA.34824 HFSF Recapitalisation commitment to 
National Bank of Greece 
IP/12/860 27 July 2012 
SA.34825 HFSF Recapitalisation commitment to 
EFG Eurobank 
IP/12/860 27 July 2012 
SA.34826 HFSF Recapitalisation commitment to 
Piraeus Bank 
IP/12/860 27 July 2012 
 
HUNGARY 
SA 34077 Extension EXME//08.03 8 March 2012 
SA.35145 Prolongation  EXME/12/30.07 30 July 2012 
SA 34078 Extension EXME/12/07.03 7 March 2012 
SA.35144 Prolongation  EXME/12/30.07 30 July 2012 
SA.29608 (C37/2010) Recapitalisation of FHB  EXME/12/22.02 22 February 2012 
 
IRELAND 
SA.34746 Prolongation Decision not to raise objections 1 June 2012 
SA.35744 Extension Decision not to raise objections 
12/12.12 
12 December 2012 
SA.35209 Prolongation Decision not to raise objections 
EXME/12/03.09 
3 September 2012 
SA.35819 Prolongation Decision not to raise objections 
EXME/14.12 
14 December 2012 
 
ITALY 
SA.34344 Amendment EXME/12/22.02 22 February 2012 
SA.35137 MPS recapitalisation IP/12/1383 17 December 2012 
 
LATVIA 
SA.30704 Temporary approval of support to Latvian 
Mortgage and Land Bank and opening of in-depth 
procedure into the measures for the bank's 
transformation 
Opening decision 
IP/12/77 
26 January 2012 
SA.34747 Amendments to Parex restructuring plan EXME/12/10.08 10 August 2012 
 
LITHUANIA 
SA 34288 Extension EXME/12/06.03 6 March 2012 
SA.35129 Prolongation EXME/12/27.07 27 July 2012 
SA.34208 Rescue of the Lithuania's Central Credit 
Unions 
MEX/12/0926 26 September 2012 
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LUXEMBOURG 
SA.34440 (2012/C) (ex 2012/N) – Sale of Dexia Opening decision 3 April 2012 
SA.34440 (2012/C) (ex 2012/N) – Sale of Dexia BIL Final no aid decision  
IP/12/840 
25 July 2012 
 
NETHERLANDS 
SA.28855 (N 373/2009) ING approval of 2009 
restructuring plan 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/468 
11 May 2012 
SA.33305 and SA.29832 Re-notification of 
recapitalisation aid to ING  
Opening decision 
IP/12/468 
11 May 2012 
SA.33305 and SA.29832 Amendment of the ING 
restructuring 
Final decision 
IP/12/1226 
16 November 2012 
 
POLAND 
SA.34081 Prolongation EXME/12/08.02 8 February 2012 
SA.34811 Prolongation EXME/12/09.07 9 July 2012 
SA.34066 Prolongation EXME/12/27.2 27 February 2012 
SA.34812 Prolongation EXME/12/29.06 29 June 2012 
 
PORTUGAL 
SA.34958 Prolongation EXME/12/27.06 27 June 2012 
SA.35743 Prolongation EXME/12/17.12 17 December 2012 
SA.34055 Prolongation  EXME/12/30.05 30 May 2012 
SA.35747 Prolongation EXME/12/17.12 17 December 2012 
SA.26909 Banco Português de Negócios  Approval of the restructuring 
IP/12/315 
27 March 2012 
SA.34055 (2011/N) - New recapitalisation scheme 
for banks in Portugal 
Decision not to raise objections 
EXME/12/30.5 
30 May 2012 
SA.35062 Recapitalisation of Caixa Geral de 
Depósitos, S.A. (CGD) 
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/805 
18 July 2012 
 
SLOVENIA 
SA.34937 Second Recapitalisation of NLB Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/724 
2 July 2012 
SA.35709 Recapitalisation of NKBM Decision not to raise objections 
EXME/12/20.12 
20 December 2012 
 
SPAIN 
SA.34224 Prolongation EXME/12/09.02 9 February 2012 
SA.34904 Extension EXME/12/29.06 29 June 2012 
SA.35069 New recapitalisation Scheme for credit 
institutions  
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/849 
25 July 2012 
SA.34255 Restructuring of CAM Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/517 
30 May 2012 
SA.34820 Rescue aid to BFA/Bankia Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/699 
27 June 2012 
SA.33733 Adjudicación UNNIM Banc a favor de 
BBVA por el FROB. Continuación de SA.33095 
(2011/N) Spain Recapitalisation of UNNIM Banc  
Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/839 
25 July 2012 
SA.35369 Urgent recapitalisation of BFA Group Decision not to raise objections 7 September 2012 
SA.33735 Restructuring of CatalunyaCaixa  Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/1277 
28 November 2012 
SA.35253 Restructuring of BFA/Bankia  Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/1277 
28 November 2012 
SA.33734 Restructuring of NovaCaixaGalicia  Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/1277 
28 November 2012 
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SA.34053 Restructuring of Banco de Valencia  Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/1277 
28 November 2012 
SA.34536 Restructuring of CEISS Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/1432 
20 December 2012 
SA.35488 Restructuring of Banco Mare Nostrum Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/1432 
20 December 2012 
SA.35489 Restructuring of Caja3  Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/1432 
20 December 2012 
SA.35490 Restructuring of Liberbank  Decision not to raise objections 
IP/12/1432 
20 December 2012 
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
SA.34218 UK Credit Easing Schemes  EXME/12/14.03 14 March 2012 
SA.34908 Extension EXME/12/26.06 26 June 2012 
SA.35755 Prolongation EXME/12/14.12 14 December 2012 
 
